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Helping Those Who Help Themselves: The Fourth Circuit's
Treatment of Agreements to Arbitrate Statutory Employment
Discrimination Claims in Brown v. ABF Freight Systems, Inc.
and EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc.
Plainly, it would not comport with the congressional
objectives behind a statute seeking to enforce civil rights...
to allow the very forces that had practiced discrimination to
contract away the right to enforce civil rights in the courts.
For federal courts to defer to arbitral decisions reached by
the same combination of forces that had long perpetuated
invidious discrimination would have made the foxes
guardians of the chickens.1
INTRODUCTION
A trial is a public event, a display of state power, which both
reflects and shapes community standards of conduct. Arbitration, on
the other hand, is a private system of dispute resolution in which
individuals grant third parties the power to resolve their differences.2
On a practical level, the fact that arbitration is faster and less
expensive than litigation has made it popular with employers and
increasingly accepted by courts.' Despite the advantages of
1. Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 750 (1981) (Burger,
C. J., dissenting).
2. For a more developed contrast between the distinguishing features of public and
private dispute resolution, see Geraldine Szott Moohr, Arbitration and the Goals of
Employment Discrimination Law, 56 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 395, 401-04 (1999). See also
Baravati v. Josephthal, Lyon & Ross, Inc., 28 F.3d 704, 709 (7th Cir. 1994) (emphasizing
the private, contractual character of arbitration); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. & Paul D. Scott,
The Public Nature of Private Adjudication, 6 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 42, 57 (1988)
(discussing the characteristics of public courts). The two standard treatises on arbitration
are IAN R. MACNEIL ET AL., FEDERAL ARBITRATION LAW (1994) and MARTIN DOMKE,
DOMKE ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION (Gabriel M. Wilner ed., 1984 & Supp. 1990).
3. See Mei L. Bickner et al., Developments in Employment Arbitration, 52 DISP.
RESOL. J., Jan. 1997, at 8, 78-79 (noting a rise in employer use of arbitration procedures
because employers fear submitting employment cases to juries and wish to avoid the time
and expense of litigation); Martin H. Malin & Robert F. Ladenson, Privatizing Justice: A
Jurisprudential Perspective on Labor and Employment Arbitration from the Steelworkers
Triology to Gilmer, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 1187, 1187-88 & nn.1 & 5 (1993) (observing that
employers make increasing use of arbitration). Chief Justice Warren Burger argued
publicly for increased use of arbitration to settle private disputes partly on the ground that
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arbitration, however, courts and commentators have struggled with
the question of whether and when to enforce predispute agreements4
to arbitrate claims arising under federal employment discrimination
statutes.5
The reasons for this struggle are not hard to fathom. With the
passage of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19646 and other
employment discrimination statutes,7 Congress authorized federal
arbitration would reduce the volume of cases brought in already over-worked federal
courts. See Warren E. Burger, Isn't There a Better Way?, 68 A.B.A. J. 274, 276-77 (1982).
The Supreme Court's increasingly receptive attitude toward arbitration is chronicled
below. See infra notes 160-99 and accompanying text.
4. A "predispute" agreement is typically signed by an employee as a condition of
accepting employment. In contrast to the controversy surrounding predispute agreements,
commentators and courts generally approve of post-dispute arbitration agreements. See,
e.g., Samuel Estreicher, Predispute Agreements to Arbitrate Statutory Employment Claims,
72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1344, 1346 (1997) [hereinafter Estreicher, Predispute Agreements]
(stating that after disputes have arisen, the parties may knowingly and voluntarily waive
their rights to a judicial forum); Jeffrey W. Stempel, A Better Approach to Arbitrability, 65
TUL. L. REV. 1377, 1419 n.207 (1991) (stating that courts have routinely enforced post-
dispute agreements to arbitrate).
5. See infra notes 135-236 and accompanying text (discussing the relevant judicial
decisions). For a representative sample of scholarly commentary, see, e.g., Sarah Rudolph
Cole, Incentives and Arbitration: The Case Against Enforcement of Executory Arbitration
Agreements Between Employers and Employees, 64 UMKC L. REv. 449, 472-83 (1996)
[hereinafter, Cole, Incentives and Arbitration] (arguing that predispute arbitration
agreements in individual employment contracts should not be enforced because
arbitration procedures systematically favor employers); Estreicher, Predispute
Agreements, supra note 4, at 1349-52 (arguing that arbitration may benefit both employers
and employees if the arbitration process has appropriate procedural safeguards); Moohr,
supra note 2, at 456-60 (arguing that while the increasing prevalence of arbitration
threatens to undermine the public goals of employment discrimination law, arbitration
may be more effective than litigation in resolving private employment disputes); Ronald
Turner, Employment Discrimination, Labor and Employment Arbitration, and the Case
Against Union Waiver of the Individual Worker's Statutory Right to a Judicial Forum, 49
EMORY L.J. 135, 191-204 (2000) (arguing that union-negotiated arbitration clauses that
mandate arbitration of statutory discrimination claims should not be enforced). Professor
Joseph Grodin aptly summarizes many of the criticisms of the increasing judicial
acceptance of agreements to arbitrate claims arising under federal civil rights laws. See
Joseph R. Grodin, Arbitration of Employment Discrimination Claims: Doctrine and Policy
in the Wake of Gilmer, 14 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 1, 50 (1996). Grodin is puzzled and
troubled by society's willingness to entrust the enforcement of civil rights laws to a private
"procedure unilaterally promulgated by the party whose conduct is sought to be
regulated." Id. Grodin also laments that arbitral decisions are not open to public scrutiny
and that they are accorded a "degree of finality we are not willing to accord the decisions
of our designated public tribunals." Id
6. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, §§ 701-716, 78 Stat. 241, 253-66
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1994)). Title VII forbids
discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. Id. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
7. The two most important employment discrimination statutes in addition to Title
VII are the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1994
& Supp. IV 1998), and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-
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lawsuits through which individual employees could serve as private
attorneys general working to further the public policy goal of ending
discrimination in the workplace.8 In the Civil Rights Act of 1991,9
Congress acted to strengthen enforcement of Title VII and the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)10 by explicitly providing for
jury trials," compensatory damages, 2 and punitive damages. 3 These
actions may suggest that Congress intends for employment
discrimination claims to be enforced only in federal court, 4 and the
Supreme Court appeared to hold this view until its landmark 1991
decision in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.15 By compelling
arbitration of a claim arising under the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (ADEA),16 the Gilmer Court sparked a sharp
increase in employer use of arbitration agreements. 7 It also raised
concerns that employee rights to be free from discrimination might be
compromised if employers can unilaterally shift efforts to vindicate
those rights from a judicial to an arbitral forum.'
12213 (1994). The ADEA forbids age-based discrimination against people aged forty or
older, 29 U.S.C. § 631(a), while the ADA forbids employment discrimination against the
disabled and imposes on employers a duty to reasonably accommodate disabled
employees so that those employees may enjoy equal employment opportunities and
benefits, 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a), 12112(b)(5).
8. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 45 (1974); Moohr, supra note
2, at 424-26.
9. Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 2,
16, and 42 U.S.C.).
10. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994).
11. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(c) (1994).
12. Id. § 1981a(a)(1)-(2).
13. Id. On punitive damages under Title VII, see generally Ann M. Anderson, Note,
Whose Malice Counts?: Kolstad and the Limits of Vicarious Liability for Title VII Punitive
Damages, 78 N.C. L. REV. 799 (2000).
14. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 47 (1974) (stating that
Congress gave the federal courts "plenary powers" to enforce Title VII).
15. 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
16. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
17. Sarah Rudolph Cole, A Funny Thing Happened on the Way to the (Alternative)
Forum: Reexamining Alexander v. Gardner-Denver in the Wake of Gilmer v.
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 1997 BYU L. REv. 591, 591-92 (1997) [hereinafter Cole,
A Funny Thing]; see also Bickner et al., supra note 3, at 15, 78 (stating that in a survey of
employers having arbitration plans for nonunionized employees, eighty-five percent of
responding employers implemented their plans after the Gilmer decision).
18. See, e.g., Grodin, supra note 5, at 50-55; Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Mandatory
Arbitration of Individual Employment Rights: The Yellow Dog Contract of the 1990s, 73
DENY. U. L. REV. 1017, 1036-50 (1996); cf. Jean R. Sternlight, Panacea or Corporate
Tool?: Debunking the Supreme Court's Preference for Binding Arbitration, 74 WASH. U.
L.Q. 637, 637-39 (1996) (emphasizing the dangers that mandatory arbitration poses for
consumers).
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Nearly a decade of experience with arbitration in the post-
Gilmer world has not entirely assuaged those concerns. 19 In some
jurisdictions, employers can take away a nonunionized employee's
right to litigate employment discrimination claims by presenting her
with a form contract or an employee handbook containing a broadly
worded arbitration clause.20 Moreover, employers with nonunionized
workplaces may have considerable freedom to unilaterally structure
the arbitration process in their favor without fear of judicial
interference. Under such circumstances, the statutory guarantee
that individuals shall be free from employment discrimination22 rings
hollow.
The Supreme Court will soon decide" whether to limit the
impact of Gilmer when it rules in Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams,24
a Ninth Circuit decision which holds that federal courts have no
authority to enforce arbitration clauses contained in employment
contracts0 Yet, even if the Court declines to retreat from Gilmer,
the statutory rights of some employees remain quite secure.
Unionized employees will rarely be barred from bringing their
employment discrimination claims in federal court under current
Supreme Court doctrine.26 It seems, then, that workers who organize
19. See, e.g., Mary Williams Walsh, Court Considers if Employer Can Force Pledge
Not to Sue, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 2000, at Al (reporting concerns that a Supreme Court
decision approving mandatory arbitration agreements in employment contracts might
"diminish the workplace status of millions of Americans"). In 1997, the EEOC issued a
policy statement opposing mandatory arbitration of employment discrimination claims if
such arbitration is imposed as a condition of employment. EEOC Notice No. 915.002
(July 10, 1997), reprinted in part in EEO Rejects Mandatory Binding Employment
Arbitration, 52 DIsP. REsOL. J., Fall 1997, at 8, 11-14, full text available at
http:llwww.eeoc.gov/docs/mandarb.html (last visited Nov. 15, 2000).
20. See, e.g., McCrea v. Copeland, 945 F. Supp. 879, 882 (D. Md. 1996) (compelling
arbitration of federal discrimination claims on ground that clause providing for arbitration
of disputes "relating to this Agreement" should be read broadly to include statutory
claims as well as contract claims); Topf v. Warnaco, Inc., 942 F. Supp. 762, 767-69 (D.
Conn. 1996) (enforcing an arbitration clause in an employee handbook despite an
employee's claims that her employer had represented that all "key" terms of the
employment contract were contained in an offer letter signed by the employee).
21. See Lisa B. Bingham, On Repeat Players, Adhesive Contracts, and the Use of
Statistics in Judicial Review of Employment Arbitration Awards, 29 MCGEORGE L. REV.
223,226-27 (1998).
22. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 51 (1974) ("Title VII's
strictures are absolute and represent a congressional command that each employee be free
from discriminatory practices.").
23. The Court heard argument in the Adams case on November 6, 2000. See infra
notes 105-06, 275-87 and accompanying text for further discussion of Adams.
24. 194 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 1999) (per curiam), cert. granted, 120 S. Ct. 2004 (2000).
25. Id. at 1070.
26. See infra notes 240-52 and accompanying text (discussing the practical effect of
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stand to gain not only greater contract rights to wages and benefits,
but also greater protection under federal employment discrimination
statutes. In short, the unspoken theme of current arbitration
jurisprudence is that courts will help those who help themselves. The
different fates of unionized and nonunionized employees in the post-
Gilmer world are starkly illustrated by two recent Fourth Circuit
decisions: Brown v. ABF Freight Systems, Inc 7 and EEOC v. Waffle
House, Inc.'
Part I of this Note discusses the facts, procedural histories, and
opinions in Brown and Waffle House.29 Part II then explores the twin
statutory sources of the federal judiciary's power to enforce
arbitration agreements: the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) and the
Labor Relations Management Act (LRMA)3 ° The history of
Supreme Court and Fourth Circuit decisions on the enforceability of
agreements to arbitrate statutory claims is reviewed in Part 111.31
Next, Part IV shows how this history has produced a legal regime
under which the statutory rights of unionized workers to freedom
from employment discrimination are comparatively secure, while the
statutory rights of nonunionized workers are vulnerable.32 Finally,
Part V of the Note argues that even though the Supreme Court will
likely hold in Adams that the federal courts have broad power over
the arbitration of employment disputes,33 courts can still take two
steps that would provide more protection for the statutory
employment rights of nonunionized workers&M First, courts should
require that any employee waiver of the right to litigate employment
discrimination claims be clear and unmistakable. Second, courts
should not compel arbitration of statutory discrimination claims
unless they have rigorously scrutinized the proposed arbitration
procedures for compliance with due process norms. 6
the Supreme Court's adoption of the "clear and unmistakable" standard for union-
negotiated waivers of the right to litigate statutory discrimination claims).
27. 183 F.3d 319 (4th Cir. 1999).
28. 193 F.3d 805 (4th Cir. 1999), petition for cert. filed, 68 U.S.L.W. 3726 (U.S. Oct. 2,
2000) (No. 99-1823).
29. See infra notes 37-88 and accompanying text.
30. See infra notes 89-134 and accompanying text.
31. See infra notes 135-236 and accompanying text.
32. See infra notes 237-74 and accompanying text.
33. See infra notes 275-87 and accompanying text.
34. See infra notes 275-420 and accompanying text.
35. See infra notes 288-373 and accompanying text.
36. See infra notes 374-420 and accompanying text.
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I. BROWN AND WAFFLE HOUSE: WINDOWS ON THE POST-GILMER
WORLD
In Brown v. ABF Freight Systems, Inc., the Fourth Circuit
rejected arguments that a broadly worded arbitration clause in a
collective bargaining agreement (CBA) required dismissal of the
plaintiff's disability discrimination claim. 7 The plaintiff, Jerome
Brown, had worked as a truck driver for Carolina Freight Carrier
(CFC) for twenty years when he was diagnosed with diabetes in
1994.38 After the United States Department of Transportation
withdrew Brown's authorization to drive interstate routes on medical
grounds, Brown obtained a special waiver from the State of Virginia
that enabled him to continue working as a truck driver as long as he
drove routes wholly within that state. 9 In September 1995, ABF
acquired CFC.4° Although Brown reached an agreement with ABF
that allowed him to continue performing the same intrastate work he
had performed for CFC,41 he was fired less than two months later.2
Brown filed a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC), alleging that he was fired because of his
disability in violation of both the Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA)43 and a Virginia disability discrimination statute.' He also
filed a grievance in accordance with the procedures outlined in a
CBA negotiated by his union,45 but abandoned the grievance process
and brought suit in federal district court after receiving a right-to-sue
letter from the EEOC.
46
The district court dismissed Brown's complaint for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction, holding that Brown was contractually
limited by his union's CBA to binding, final arbitration as the sole
37. Brown v. ABF Freight Sys., Inc., 183 F.3d 319,323 (4th Cir. 1999).
38. See Brown v. ABF Freight Sys., Inc., 997 F. Supp. 714,715 (E.D. Va. 1998), rev'd,





43. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994).
44. Brown, 997 F. Supp. at 715 (citing the Virginians with Disabilities Act, VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 51.5-40 to -46 (Michie 1998)).
45. Id.
46. Id. Under both Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the ADA, an
individual may bring her own lawsuit only if the EEOC decides not to pursue the case on
its own. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-(5) (1994) (describing procedures for enforcement of rights
under Title VII); 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a) (1994) (stating that the ADA is enforced through
the same mechanisms established in Title VII).
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remedy for his statutory discrimination claims.47 In so holding, the
court relied on Austin v. Owens-Brockway Glass Container, Inc.,4 s an
earlier Fourth Circuit decision which held that an individual
employee's right to seek relief from employment discrimination in
federal court could be waived in an arbitration agreement negotiated
between the employee's union and his employer.4 9 The CBA at issue
in Brown contained a broad nondiscrimination provision 0 as well as
an agreement that " '[a]ll grievances or questions of interpretation
arising under this... Agreement... shall be processed' in accordance
with the ... grievance procedure" and submitted to binding
arbitration should the grievance procedure fail to produce a
solution. 1 Analogizing this language to that of the CBA in Austin,
the district court read the CBA's nondiscrimination provision as
incorporating the entire ADA into the contract. 2 The court reasoned
that in agreeing not to discriminate, the parties had assumed a
contractual obligation to follow federal anti-discrimination law. It
therefore concluded that disputes about whether the ADA had been
violated "arose under" the CBA and thus had to be submitted to
binding arbitration.53
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit reversed.54 The court based its
decision on two cases decided after the district court's disposition of
Brown: Wright v. Universal Maritime Service Corp.55 and Carson v.
Giant Food, Inc.56  In Wright, the Supreme Court held that courts
should enforce only "clear and unmistakable" union-negotiated
waivers of employee rights to bring job discrimination lawsuits in
47. Brown, 997 F. Supp. at 721.
48. 78 F.3d 875 (4th Cir. 1996).
49. d. at 885. For further discussion of Austin, see infra notes 215-24 and
accompanying text.
50. The nondiscrimination clause read:
The Employer and the Union agree not to discriminate against any
individual with respect to hiring, compensation, terms or conditions of
employment because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, age, or
national origin nor will they limit, segregate or classify employees in any way
to deprive any individual employee of employment opportunities because of
race, color, religion, sex, age, or national origin or engage in any other
discriminatory acts prohibited by law. This Article also covers employees
with a qualified disability under the Americans with Disabilities Act.
Brown, 997 F. Supp. at 715-16 (quoting Article 37 of the CBA).
51. Id. at 716 (quoting Article 8 of the CBA).
52. See id. at 720-21.
53. Id.
54. Brown v. ABF Freight Sys., Inc., 183 F.3d 319,323 (4th Cir. 1999).
55. 525 U.S. 70 (1998).
56. 175 F.3d 325 (4th Cir. 1999).
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federal court.5 7 In Carson, the Fourth Circuit had decided that such a
clear and unmistakable waiver could occur in two ways: (1) the
arbitration clause of the CBA could explicitly include statutory
employment discrimination claims;58 or (2) some other part of the
CBA (normally, the nondiscrimination clause) could make
compliance with federal discrimination statutes part of the agreement
between the union and the employer.5 9 In the light of Wright and
Carson, the Fourth Circuit held that a "broad but nonspecific
60
arbitration clause encompassing disputes "arising under" the CBA
did not constitute a clear and unmistakable waiver of Brown's right to
litigate his ADA claims.61
Despite facts that seem more favorable to the plaintiff than those
in Brown, the Fourth Circuit enforced a broadly worded arbitration
clause in EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc.6' In June 1994, Eric Baker
completed and signed an application to work at a Waffle House
restaurant in Columbia, South Carolina.63 At the bottom of the first
page of the application was a mandatory arbitration clause printed in
seven-point type,' which provided that " 'any dispute or claim
57. Wright, 525 U.S. at 80.
58. The Carson court stated that a clause requiring arbitration of "all federal causes of
action arising out of their employment" would satisfy the "clear and unmistakable"
standard. Carson, 175 F.3d at 331. Other authorities have suggested that CBA drafters
should identify the specific statutes included within the intended scope of the arbitration
clause in order to make the clause enforceable. Prince v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 37 F.
Supp. 2d 289,293 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (holding that the arbitration clause failed the "clear and
unmistakable" test partly because "it [did] not identify the statutes by name or citation"):
Daniel Roy, Note, Mandatory Arbitration of Statutory Claims in the Union Workplace
After Wright v. Universal Maritime Service Corp., 74 IND. L.J. 1347, 1373-74 (1999)
(recommending that the "clear and unmistakable" test be interpreted to validate only
arbitration clauses that explicitly list the statutory claims meant to be subject to binding
arbitration).
59. See Carson, 175 F.3d at 332.
60. Brown v. ABF Freight Sys., Inc., 183 F.3d 319, 322 (4th Cir. 1999) (quoting
Carson, 175 F.3d at 331). The court also held that the CBA's agreement "not to 'engage in
any other discriminatory acts prohibited by law'" was not enough to incorporate the
ADA by reference. Id. (quoting Article 37 of the CBA). Although the second sentence
of the nondiscrimination clause in the Brown CBA explicitly mentioned the ADA, the
court ruled that this sentence merely added disability to the list of reasons for which the
parties were not allowed to discriminate under the agreement. Id at 323.
61. Id. at 321-22. The court acknowledged that it might have decided the case
differently if it were not bound by the Supreme Court's decision in Wright. Id. at 321.
62. 193 F.3d 805 (4th Cir. 1999), petition for cert. filed, 68 U.S.L.W. 3726 (U.S. Oct. 2,
2000) (No. 99-1823).
63. Id. at 807.
64. Id. at 814 n.1 (King, J., dissenting). Judge King noted that no other part of the
application was printed in a typeface so small and that the entire arbitration clause
occupied only five-sixteenths of an inch on a page that was eleven inches long. Id. (King,
J., dissenting).
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concerning the Applicant's employment with Waffle House, Inc., or
any subsidiary or Franchisee of Waffle House, Inc., or the terms,
conditions, or benefits of such employment, including whether such
dispute or claim is arbitrable, will be settled by binding
arbitration.' "6 Baker declined an offer of employment from the
store manager.66
Three weeks later, Baker entered another Waffle House
restaurant three miles away from the first restaurant and accepted an
oral offer of employment from that restaurant's manager.67 Baker did
not complete an application, and there was no evidence that the
manager of the second restaurant knew that Baker had previously
completed and signed an application at the first restaurant.68 Roughly
two weeks after beginning work at the second Waffle House, Baker
had a seizure at work-apparently caused by a change in the
medications he used to control a seizure disorder.69  Shortly
thereafter, Waffle House discharged Baker for the "benefit and
safety" of both Baker and Waffle House.70
Baker filed a charge with the EEOC alleging violations of the
ADA, and the EEOC elected to pursue the matter in court.7' Waffle
House moved to compel arbitration, but the district court rejected its
argument that Baker and the EEOC were bound by the arbitration
clause in the employment application Baker had signed during his
visit to the first Waffle House restaurant.72  The court held that
because Baker was not hired pursuant to the employment application
he had completed at the first restaurant, there was simply no
arbitration agreement between Baker and Waffle House.
73
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit rejected the district court's
analysis.74 The court reasoned that because the application was for
employment with Waffle House, Inc. rather than with a particular
franchise, it "followed" Baker to any Waffle House franchise to
65. Id. (King, J., dissenting) (quoting the employment application).
66. Id. at 807.
67. L at 814 (King, J., dissenting).
68. Id (King, J., dissenting).
69. Id. at 807.
70. Id (quoting the separation notice).
71. Id. The EEOC sought a permanent injunction preventing Waffle House from
discriminating against the disabled, an order that would require Waffle House to institute
programs to combat disability discrimination in its restaurants, and a variety of remedies
specific to Baker. Id. at 807-08. The remedies sought for Baker included reinstatement
with backpay, compensatory damages, and punitive damages. Id.
72. Id at 808.
73. Id.
74. Id at 808-09.
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which he might apply 5 Although the court allowed the EEOC to
pursue injunctive relief against Waffle House pursuant to its role as a
promoter of the public interest in ending workplace discrimination,
the court held that the EEOC could not seek individualized relief for
Baker in federal court because Baker had waived his right to a
judicial forum by signing the mandatory arbitration clause.7 6  The
court reasoned, in other words, that the EEOC could not do for
Baker under its own name what Baker could not do for himself.
Unlike Jerome Brown, Eric Baker was required to resolve his
discrimination claims through arbitration.
When Brown and Waffle House are placed side by side, the
difference in result between the two cases is surprising. The
arbitration clause in Waffle House contained just the sort of language
that the Brown court had found too general to waive the right to a
judicial forum for statutory discrimination claims.77 Further, it did not
even contain an anti-discrimination clause that might be construed to
incorporate federal employment discrimination law by reference.78
Finally, as Judge King pointed out in his dissent in Waffle House, Eric
Baker would not have expected to be bound by any arbitration
agreement, much less an agreement to arbitrate discrimination claims
created by federal statute.79 If the courtroom door was opened for
Brown, surely one would expect it to have been opened for Baker as
well.
75. I& Judge King strongly objected to this aspect of the majority's analysis. He
claimed that to treat an application for employment at a single restaurant as an application
to every restaurant in the chain flies in the face of both common sense and the reasonable
expectations of employees. Id& at 818 (King, J., dissenting). More fundamentally, he
argued that the majority's analysis was inconsistent with basic principles of contract law,
which courts must consult in deciding whether an arbitration agreement has been created.
Id. at 815-16 (King, J., dissenting) (citing Johnson v. Circuit City Stores, 148 F.3d 373, 377
(4th Cir. 1998)). Judge King argued that those principles suggest that the terms of the
offer of employment at the first Waffle House, including those terms contained in the
signed employment application, did not survive Baker's rejection of that offer. See id. at
816 (King, J., dissenting) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 36, 38
(1981)).
76. Id. at 811-13.
77. See supra text accompanying note 65 (quoting the arbitration clause from the
Waffle House Employment Application). Judge King noted that even if he had accepted
the majority's argument that there was a mandatory arbitration agreement between Baker
and Waffle House, he would have held the agreement unenforceable because the
arbitration clause did not provide Baker with adequate notice that he was waiving federal
statutory rights. Waffle House, 193 F.3d at 817 n.8 (King, J., dissenting) (citing Rosenberg
v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 170 F.3d 1, 20-21 (1st Cir. 1999)).
78. Compare text accompanying note 65 (quoting the arbitration clause in Waffle
House), with note 50 (quoting the nondiscrimination provision in the Brown CBA).
79. See Waffle House, 193 F.3d at 817-18 (King, J., dissenting).
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Nevertheless, the Fourth Circuit's divergent treatment of the
arbitration clauses in Brown and Waffle House is generally consistent
with both current Supreme Court doctrine and the practice of other
circuits.80 The Supreme Court has said that in deciding whether to
enforce contractual language requiring the arbitration of a particular
dispute, courts must assess that language on two levels.81 First, they
must ask whether the parties have actually agreed to arbitrate the
particular dispute." In other words, they must focus on issues of
mutual assent, asking whether a contract to arbitrate has been
formed, as well as how that contract should be interpreted. Second,
courts finding that the parties have agreed to arbitrate a particular
dispute must consider whether any policy considerations external to
that private agreement preclude its enforcement.' At both the level
of assent and the level of enforceability, courts currently treat union
and nonunion employees differently. At the level of assent, the
80. Waffle House is unusual mainly for its willingness to find a contract to arbitrate
where basic principles of contract law suggest that no such contract was ever formed. See
id. at 813-18 (King, J. dissenting). It is not unusual in its untroubled assumption that a
broad and unspecific arbitration clause in an individual employment contract should be
read to require the arbitration of statutory discrimination claims. See, e.g., Gilmer v.
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 23 (1991) (holding that a New York Stock
Exchange rule requiring "arbitration of '[a]ny controversy between a registered
representative and any member or member organization arising out of the employment or
termination of employment of such registered representative'" precluded litigation of a
claim arising under the ADEA) (quoting New York Stock Exchange Rule 347); Brown v.
ITT Consumer Fin. Corp., 211 F.3d 1217, 1221-22 (11th Cir. 2000) (holding that an
agreement to arbitrate "any dispute between [the parties] or claim by either against the
other" encompassed the plaintiff's racial discrimination claim); Oldroyd v. Elmira Say.
Bank, 134 F.3d 72, 76 (2nd Cir. 1998) (holding that an agreement to arbitrate "'[a]ny
dispute, controversy or claim arising under or in connection with [the plaintiff's
employment agreement]'" was a "prototypical broad arbitration provision" that
encompassed a retaliatory discharge claim (quoting the employment agreement's
arbitration clause); Alison Brooke Overby, Note, Arbitrability of Disputes under the
Federal Arbitration Act, 71 IOwA L. REv. 1137, 1144-45 (1986) (stating that courts nearly
always find an issue arbitrable when faced with broadly worded clauses mandating
arbitration of disputes "arising out of or relating to" a contract). Courts make this
assumption because the Supreme Court has directed them to interpret arbitration clauses
concerning nonunion employees in light of a presumption of arbitrability. See infra notes
163-67, 310-24 and accompanying text (discussing the presumption of arbitrability under
the FAA).
81. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628
(1985).
82. Id.
83. Id A court might find an agreement to arbitrate statutory claims unenforceable
because enforcing the clause would undermine the policies promoted by the statute. See,
e.g., Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 47 (1974) (holding that a prior
arbitration proceeding did not preclude a race discrimination lawsuit because Congress
had intended federal courts to enforce the anti-discrimination policies of Title VII).
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Supreme Court has held that union-negotiated waivers of the right to
sue under federal employment discrimination statutes must be clear
and unmistakable. 4  In contrast, arbitration clauses in individual
employment agreements are read in light of a presumption of
arbitrability, according to which "any doubts concerning the scope of
arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration, whether
the problem at hand is the construction of the contract language itself
or an allegation of waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability." '85
At the level of enforceability, all circuits save the Fourth hold that
union-negotiated waivers of the right to litigate statutory
discrimination claims are unenforceable,86 though the Supreme Court
has yet to rule on this question.' In contrast, agreements to arbitrate
statutory discrimination claims in nonunion contexts are widely
enforced according to a second presumption of arbitrability,
according to which such clauses are presumptively enforceable absent
some clear indication of congressional intent to preclude arbitration
of the relevant statutory claim.88 Although significant differences
exist between CBA's and individual employment contracts, such
radically disparate judicial treatment is difficult to justify. Reviewing
the history of federal law governing the enforceability of arbitration
agreements will help to explain the present state of affairs.
84. Wright v. Universal Mar. Serv. Corp., 525 U.S. 70, 80 (1998). The Court also
stated that the "clear and unmistakable" standard does not apply to an individual's waiver
of her own rights. Id. at 80-81.
85. Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1983).
86. See infra notes 204-13 and accompanying text (discussing the refusal of most
circuits to compel arbitration of statutory discrimination claims where the arbitration
clause is part of a CBA).
87. Wright, 525 U.S. at 77 (stating that the Court found it "unnecessary to resolve the
question of the validity of a union-negotiated waiver").
88. Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 628 (stating that once the parties have made a bargain to
arbitrate, "they should be held to it unless Congress itself has evinced an intention to
preclude a waiver of judicial remedies for the statutory rights at issue"). While courts and
commentators have not been explicit about the point, the phrase "presumption of
arbitrability" denotes two distinct ideas: (1) that the language of an arbitration clause
should be read generously, and (2) that agreements to arbitrate statutory claims are
enforceable unless Congress has clearly signaled that those statutory claims are not subject
to arbitration. See infra notes 167-78 and accompanying text (discussing the two
presumptions of arbitrability endorsed in Mitsubishi).
[Vol. 79
2000] ARBITRATION OF STATUTORY CLAIMS
II. THE STATUTORY ROOTS OF FEDERAL ARBITRATION
JURISPRUDENCE
Arbitration agreements were not enforceable at common law
because courts viewed such agreements as an attempt to usurp their
jurisdiction. 9 In light of this common law tradition, judicial authority
to enforce arbitration agreements has always been a creature of
statute. The authority of federal courts to enforce arbitration clauses
in nonunion employment contracts stems from the Federal
Arbitration Act (FAA),9° while their authority to enforce arbitration
agreements in the collective bargaining context is rooted in the Labor
Management Relations Act (LMRA). 91
Responding to pressure from both the American Bar Association
and business interests that favored arbitration as a fast and relatively
low-cost way to settle disputes over commercial contracts, Congress
passed the FAA in 1925. 92 Section 2 of the FAA makes written
arbitration agreements enforceable unless they violate some general
principle of contract law.93 When the parties to a dispute have signed
a valid arbitration agreement, federal district courts must stay any
89. Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 510 n.4 (1974); H.R. REP. No. 68-96,
at 1-2 (1924) (Sup. Docs. No. Y 1.1/2:8226) (discussing early judicial hostility to executory
arbitration agreements); Harry Baum & Leon Pressman, The Enforcement of Commercial
Arbitration Agreements in the Federal Courts, 8 N.Y.U. L. REv. 238,238-43 (1930) (same);
Wesley A. Sturges & Irving Olds Murphy, Some Confusing Matters Relating to Arbitration
Under the United States Arbitration Act, 17 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 580, 581-82 (1952)
(same). Some early American cases expressing hostility toward arbitration agreements as
efforts to divest the courts of jurisdiction include Insurance Co. v. Morse, 87 U.S. (20
Wall.) 445, 451 (1874), and Wood v. Humphrey, 114 Mass. 185, 186 (1873). For a listing of
English common law cases invalidating executory arbitration agreements, see Sarah E.
Rudolph, Blackstone's Vision of Alternative Dispute Resolution, 22 MEM. ST. U. L. REv.
279, 291 n.70 (1992).
90. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (1994).
91. 29 U.S.C. §§ 185-188 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
92. United States Arbitration Act, ch. 213, 43 Stat. 883 (1925) (codified as amended at
9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (1994)). The United States Code version of the Act was enacted into
positive law in 1947. Act of July 30, 1947, ch. 392, 61 Stat. 669. Although older sources
sometimes refer to 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 as the United States Arbitration Act, today "FAA" is
the more common label. See William F. Kolakowski III, Note, The Federal Arbitration Act
and Individual Employment Contracts: A Better Means to an Equally Just End, 93 MICH.
L. REV. 2171, 2172 n.10 (1995). For a discussion of the FAA's legislative history, see
Jonathan R. Nelson, Judge-Made Law and the Presumption of Arbitrability: David L.
Threlkeld & Co. v. Metallgesellschaft Ltd., 58 BROOK. L. REv. 279,280-83 (1992).
93. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (stating that a "written provision ... to arbitrat[e] ... shall be valid,
irrevocable, and enforceable save upon such grounds as exist at law or equity for the
revocation of any contract"). This provision was intended to put agreements to arbitrate
on the same footing as other contracts. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Gonklin Mfg. Co.,
388 U.S. 395,404 n.12 (1967); H.R. REP. No. 68-96, at 1.
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litigation between the parties until the conclusion of the arbitration
process. 4  Furthermore, federal courts have the power to compel
arbitration95 and may enter orders confirming arbitration awards.
96 In
order to preserve the finality of arbitration awards, judicial review
under the FAA is extremely limited.'
The FAA applies only to written arbitration clauses in contracts
involving maritime transactions and contracts "evidencing a
transaction involving [interstate] commerce."98  Once a court has
established that a contract is within one of these classes, it must ask
whether the contract falls within the exclusionary clause in section
one of the FAA, which excludes from the scope of the Act "contracts
of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of
workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce."
99 The primary
94. 9 U.S.C. § 3 (providing that a federal district court must stay any suit or
proceeding involving issues covered by a written arbitration agreement "upon being
satisfied that the issue involved in such suit or proceeding is referable to arbitration under
such an agreement").
95. 9 U.S.C. § 4 ("A party aggrieved by the alleged failure, neglect, or refusal of
another to arbitrate under a written agreement for arbitration may petition any United
States district court which, save for such agreement, would have jurisdiction" over a
lawsuit arising out of the underlying controversy between the parties for an order
compelling arbitration.).
96. 9 U.S.C. § 9 (providing that "at any time within one year after [an arbitration]
award is made any party to the arbitration may apply to [federal district court] for an
order confirming the award, and thereupon the court must grant such an order unless the
award is vacated, modified, or corrected as prescribed in [9 U.S.C. §8 10, 11]").
97. An arbitration award may be vacated only when: (1) the award was secured
through "corruption, fraud, or undue means;" (2) the arbitrators were obviously partial or
corrupt; (3) the arbitrators engaged in misconduct prejudicial to the rights of a party (for
example, by refusing to postpone a hearing despite a showing of sufficient grounds for
postponement); or (4) the arbitrators exceeded their powers. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a). Courts do
not vacate arbitral decisions merely because the arbitrators misinterpreted the law, see
Michael A. Scodro, Arbitrating Novel Legal Questions: A Recommendation for Reform,
105 YALE L.J. 1927, 1937 (1996), though they have sometimes overturned awards resulting
from "manifest disregard" of the law, see, e.g., DiRussa v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 121
F.3d 818, 821 (2d Cir. 1997) (stating that manifest disregard standard is met when the
arbitrators knew the law but deliberately refused to follow it or the arbitrators ignored law
that was well established and clearly applicable to the case); see generally Stephen L.
Hayford, Law in Disarray: Judicial Standards for Vacatur of Commercial Arbitration
Awards, 30 GA. L. REv. 731 (1996) (discussing various common law grounds that courts
have used to vacate arbitration awards).
98. 9 U.S.C. § 2. The definition of "commerce" in § 1 indicates that the term includes
only interstate commerce. Id. § 1. The limitation to maritime transactions and interstate
commerce functions to keep the scope of the FAA from exceeding Congress's power
under the Commerce Clause. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
99. Federal Arbitration Act § 1, 9 U.S.C. § 1. For brief, general discussions of
disputes about the scope of the section 1 exclusion, see RICHARD A. BALES,
COMPULSORY ARBITRATION: THE GRAND EXPERIMENT IN EMPLOYMENT 32-48
(1997); Grodin, supra note 5, at 17-28.
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debate about the meaning of the exclusion is whether "any other class
of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce" should be
read broadly to include all workers or read narrowly to include only
those workers employed in the transportation industries. Under a
broad reading, federal courts would have no authority to enforce
arbitration clauses in individual employment contracts.
The circuits are currently split on the scope of the section 1
exclusion. The Ninth Circuit has held that the FAA does not apply to
employment contracts, 100 a position that finds considerable support in
the legislative history of the Act. 1' Most other circuits' °2 and some
100. Craft v. Campbell Soup Co., 177 F.3d 1083, 1094 (9th Cir. 1999) (per curiam)
(denying petition for en banc review), amending 161 F.3d 1199 (9th Cir. 1998). At least
one Supreme Court Justice, a few courts, and several commentators have also stated that
the FAA does not apply to employment contracts. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane
Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 36-42 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that the section 1
exclusion covers all employees engaged in interstate commerce, including those governed
by commercial arbitration agreements); Pritzker v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner, &
Smith, Inc., 7 F.3d 1110, 1119-20 (3d Cir. 1993) (stating in dicta that the FAA does not
apply to employment contracts) (ignoring contrary circuit precedent in Tenney Eng'g, Inc.
v. United Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers, 207 F.2d 450, 452-53 (3d Cir. 1953)); Arce v.
Cotton Club of Greenville, Inc., 883 F. Supp. 117, 120-23 (N.D. Miss. 1995) (relying on
legislative history to support a broad reading of the section 1 exclusion); R. Gaull
Silbermann et al., Alternative Dispute Resolution of Employment Discrimination Claims,
54 LA. L. REv. 1533, 1546 (1994) (suggesting that the section 1 exclusion should be read
broadly because no convincing reason exists for varying the rule governing the
enforceability of agreements to arbitrate statutory discrimination claims according to the
industries in which workers are employed); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Reconsidering the
Employment Contract Exclusion in Section 1 of the Federal Arbitration Act: Correcting the
Judiciary's Failure of Statutory Vision, 1991 J. Disp. REsOL. 259, 288-304 (1991)
(analyzing the section 1 exclusion using various theories of statutory interpretation and
concluding that courts should adopt a broad reading). Professor Grodin observes that it is
difficult to explain why Congress would have wanted to exempt from the FAA only that
particular subset of workers most obviously subject to the Commerce Clause Power.
Singling out transportation workers from the class of all workers engaged in interstate
commerce seems to bear no rational relation to any legitimate government purpose.
Accordingly, Grodin argues that courts should avoid a narrow interpretation of the section
1 exclusion because such an interpretation might raise problems under the equal
protection component of the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause. See Grodin, supra
note 5, at 19.
101. The chairman of the American Bar Association committee that drafted the FAA
testified before a Senate committee that the bill was "not intended ... [to] be an act
referring to labor disputes, at all. It is purely an act to give the merchants the right or the
privilege of sitting down and agreeing with each other as to what their damages are, if they
want to do it." Hearings on S. 4213 and S. 4214 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
67th Cong., 4th Sess. 9 (1923) (statement of W.H.H. Piatt, chairman of the ABA
committee that drafted the FAA). For a detailed treatment of the historical evidence on
the scope of the FAA's section 1 exclusion, see Matthew W. Finkin, "Workers' Contracts"
Under The United States Arbitration Act: An Essay in Historical Clarification, 17
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 282,283-89,295-97 (1996).
102. E.g., Cole v. Burns Int'l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1470-71 (D.C. Cir. 1997)
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commentators, however, have appealed to the principle of ejusdem
generis'°3 and alternative readings of the legislative history to argue
that the exclusion should be read narrowly to apply only to workers in
the transportation industries."°  The Supreme Court has granted
certiorari"°5 in a Ninth Circuit case, Circuit City Stores, Inc., v.
Adams,0 16 in order to resolve the split. The Court is likely to follow
the majority of circuits in adopting a narrow reading. 7
(holding that section 1 of the FAA exempts only the "employment contracts of workers
actually engaged in the movement of goods in interstate commerce"); Rojas v. TK
Communications, Inc., 87 F.3d 745, 748 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding that the exclusionary
language in section 1 should be read narrowly to include only workers involved in the
transportation industries); Asplundh Tree Expert Co. v. Bates, 71 F.3d 592, 600-01 (6th
Cir. 1995) (same); Miller Brewing Co. v. Brewery Workers Local Union, 739 F.2d 1159,
1162 (7th Cir. 1984) (same); Erving v. Va. Squires Basketball Club, 468 F.2d 1064, 1069
(2d Cir. 1972) (same); Dickstein v. DuPont, 443 F.2d 783, 785 (1st Cir. 1971) (same);
Tenney, 207 F.2d at 452-53 (same).
103. Ejusdem generis is a canon of statutory construction which directs that "when a
general, word or phrase follows a list of specific persons or things, the general word or
phrase will be interpreted to include only persons or things of the same type as those
listed." BLACK'S LAW DIcTIONARY 535 (7th ed. 1999). Here, the principle would direct
that the phrase "any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce" be
construed to include only those workers of the same type as seamen and railroad
employees-those workers who transport goods in interstate commerce.
104. See, e.g., Tenney, 207 F.2d at 452-53 (relying on ejusdem generis and the legislative
history of the FAA in ruling that the section 1 exclusion should be read narrowly); Gerard
Morales & Kelly Humphrey, The Enforceability of Agreements to Arbitrate Employment
Disputes, 43 LAB. L.J. 663, 668-69 (1992) (arguing from legislative history that Congress
intended for the section 1 exclusion to apply only to transportation workers); Kolakowski,
supra note 92, at 2179-80 (arguing that ejusdem generis requires a narrow reading of the
section 1 exclusion). Contra Stempel, supra 100, at 292-93 (rejecting the ejusdem generis
argument for a narrow reading of the section 1 exclusion).
105. 120 S. Ct. 2004 (2000).
106. 194 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 1999) (per curiam). Adams followed Craft in holding that
the FAA does not apply to employment contracts. Id at 1070. The Supreme Court heard
oral arguments in the case on November 6,2000.
107. See Estreicher, Predispute Argreements, supra note 4, at 1371-72 (suggesting that
the Supreme Court would be unlikely to adopt a broad reading of the section 1 exclusion);
infra notes 275-87 and accompanying text (discussing Adams and predicting that the
Supreme Court will reverse the Ninth Circuit). Professor Estreicher rejects the terms of
the primary debate by arguing that the only plausible readings of the section 1 exclusion
are (1) that all employees involved in interstate commerce are exempted from the scope of
the FAA, or (2) that only unionized workers are exempted. Samuel Estreicher,
Arbitration of Employment Disputes Without Unions, 66 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 753, 762 n.30
(1990) [hereinafter Estreicher, Arbitration Without Unions]. Professor Estreicher
dismisses the reading of section 1 to exclude only workers involved in the transportation
industries as "artificial." Id. His interpretation is based on legislative history indicating
that the section 1 exclusion was inserted into the FAA in response to pressure from labor
groups that worried that the FAA might be read to interfere with collective bargaining.
See id. at 761-62. Accordingly, he argues that "contracts of employment" includes CBAs
but excludes individual employment contracts. However persuasive one finds Estreicher's
appeals to legislative history, his interpretation is not fully convincing because it requires
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Federal labor law provides the other statutory source of judicial
receptivity to arbitration.08 The Supreme Court has read section 301
of the LMRA 1°9 to authorize the federal courts to compel arbitration
in the collective bargaining context."0  In the 1960 decisions
commonly known as the Steelworkers Trilogy,"' the Court expressed
a strong preference for arbitration as a means of resolving labor
disputes'12 and preserving industrial peace," 3 and established four
fundamental principles that govern the interpretation of collective
bargaining agreements."4
First, courts should respect the contractual character of
arbitration by refusing to force parties to arbitrate matters that they
did not agree to arbitrate."5 Second, disagreements about what the
parties have agreed to arbitrate should be resolved by a court rather
than by the arbitrator unless the parties "clearly and unmistakably"
an unnatural reading of the statutory text.
108. See Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act (LMRA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 185-
187 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998); National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169
(1994). The circuit courts of appeals are currently split over whether the FAA applies to
CBAs. Compare Domino Sugar v. Sugar Workers Local 392, 10 F.3d 1064, 1067 (4th Cir.
1993) (holding that the FAA does not apply to CBAs), Posadas de Puerto Rico Assocs. v.
Asociacion de Empleados de Casino, 873 F.2d 479, 482 (1st Cir. 1989) (stating that the
FAA "is inapplicable to most labor contracts"), United Food & Commercial Workers v.
Safeway, 889 F.2d 940, 943-44 (10th Cir. 1989) (holding that the FAA does not apply to
CBAs), and Am. Postal Workers Union v. United States Postal Serv., 823 F.2d 466, 473
(11th Cir. 1987) (same), with Int'l Assoc. of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Gen.
Elec. Co., 406 F.2d 1046, 1049 (2d Cir. 1969) (holding that the FAA applies to CBAs),
Newark Stereotypers Union v. Newark Morning News, 397 F.2d 594, 596 (3d Cir. 1968)
(same), and Pietro Sclazitti Co. v. Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, 351 F.2d 576, 579-80
(7th Cir. 1965) (same). The Supreme Court has not definitively answered the question,
but has implied that collective bargaining agreements fall outside the scope of the FAA.
See United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 40 n.9 (1987) (observing
that the "federal courts have often looked to the [FAA] for guidance in labor arbitration
cases" and thereby implying that the FAA does not directly apply in such cases).
109. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act § 301,29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1994).
110. See Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448,450-52 (1957).
111. See United Steelworkers v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960);
United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United
Steelworkers v. Am. Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960).
112. See Enterprise Wheel, 363 U.S. at 596 (stating that arbitrators are essential to the
collective bargaining process); Warrior & Gulf, 363 U.S. at 582 (stating that courts should
order arbitration "unless it may be said with positive assurance that the arbitration clause
is not susceptible of an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute"); American Mfg.
Co., 363 U.S. at 568 (ordering the enforcement of an arbitration agreement).
113. See Textile Workers Union, 353 U.S. at 455 (stating that agreements to arbitrate
labor disputes are given in exchange for agreements not to strike, and hence help to
preserve industrial peace).
114. See AT&T Techs., Inc. v. Communications Workers, 475 U.S. 643, 648-51 (1986)
(summarizing the principal doctrines established by the Steelworkers Trilogy).
115. Id. at 648 (citing Warrior & Gulf, 363 U.S. at 582).
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provide that the arbitrator may decide the scope of her own
authority.116  Third, courts should not consider the merits of the
underlying claims when deciding whether a particular grievance must
be submitted to arbitration; even apparently frivolous claims must be
judged on the merits by the arbitrator."7 Finally, the Trilogy
established a "presumption of arbitrability" which provides that
" '[an] order to arbitrate ... should not be denied unless it may be
said with positive assurance that the arbitration clause is not
susceptible of an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute.
Doubts should be resolved in favor of coverage.' "118
Despite the differences between commercial arbitration and
collective bargaining, the FAA and the LMRA are similar in that
both were designed to allow the federal courts to enforce agreements
to arbitrate disputes between "repeat players"" 9 of roughly equal
bargaining power.2 0 The FAA was originally intended to encourage
the arbitration of commercial contract disputes,'2 ' a context for which
arbitration is especially well suited. Commercial parties often favor
arbitration because the preservation of their on-going business
relationship through rapid, private dispute resolution is more
important to them than getting the correct result in a particular
case." When the parties are both repeat players, they can sensibly
116. Id at 649 (citing Warrior & Gulf, 363 U.S. at 582-83).
117. Id- at 649-50.
118. Id. at 650 (quoting Warrior & Gulf, 363 U.S. at 582-83).
119. The seminal article for the use of game theory in analyzing dispute resolution is
Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal
Change, 9 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 95 (1974). Galanter explains that "repeat players" expect
to deal with one another on a recurring basis and are motivated by an interest in
"continued mutually beneficial interaction." Id. at 110.
120. See Cole, Incentives and Arbitration, supra note 5, at 454-59 (discussing the origins
of commercial arbitration as a mechanism for settling contractual disputes between repeat
player merchants who wished to maintain an ongoing business relationship); Cole, A
Funny Thing, supra note 17, at 624-28 (explaining that arbitration is appropriate in the
collective bargaining context because both the union and the employer are "repeat
players").
121. Craft v. Campell Soup Co., 177 F.3d 1083, 1089 (9th Cir. 1999) (per curiam)
("[Tihe legislative history demonstrates that the [FAA's] purpose was solely to bind
merchants who were involved in commercial dealings."), amending 161 F.3d 1199 (9th Cir.
1998); H.R. REP. No. 68-96, at 1 (1924) (Sup. Docs. No. Y 1.1/2:8226) ("The purpose of
this bill is to make valid and enforceable agreements for arbitration contained in contracts
involving interstate commerce .... "); Cole, Incentives and Arbitration, supra note 5, at
459-67 (sketching the historical development of commercial arbitration and explaining
that the FAA was meant to promote commercial arbitration).
122. Cole, Incentives and Arbitration, supra note 5, at 457-58. Professor Cole points
out, however, that the preference for arbitration dissolves in those cases where the amount
at stake in a particular dispute exceeds the value of the ongoing relationship. Id. at 457
n.34.
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sacrifice procedural protections and the opportunity for judicial
review in order to minimize the delay and potential loss of goodwill
that formal litigation might bring." The value of arbitration to
merchants depends, however, on the knowing and voluntary
character of the agreement to arbitrate.2 Any attempt by one party
to force arbitration on an unwilling adversary would likely undermine
the very business relationship that commercial arbitration is meant to
protect.'2
Similarly, in labor arbitration under the LMRA, both the union
and the employer are repeat players who expect disputes as an
inevitable part of their ongoing relationship. 6 Indeed, the process of
resolving disputes through arbitration gives shape to the basic
principles of the collective bargaining agreement and creates a
"common law of the shop" that governs the workplace. 2 7 As in
commercial arbitration, both parties are willing to accept some errors
in the arbitration process as long as that process displays no
systematic bias."z Furthermore, the rough equality of bargaining
power between labor and management and the desire of both sides to
maintain a smooth working relationship provides protection against
overreaching by either party.
29
When commercial contracts and collective bargaining
agreements are at issue, then, the parties have similar reasons for
favoring arbitration. In addition, their status as repeat players with
comparable bargaining power provides some assurance that the
arbitral forum will be neutral and fair.3 ° Another equally significant
commonality is that both commercial arbitration and labor arbitration
have traditionally dealt with contract rights-rights created and
defined by agreements between private parties, and subject to
modification by those same private parties. 3' In contrast, statutory
123. 1d at 458 & n.37.
124. Id. at 467.
125. Id Professor Cole also points out that arbitration will be neither speedy nor
cheap if one of the parties wants to explore every avenue to defeat the arbitration
agreement. Id.
126. Cole, A Funny Thing, supra note 17, at 618, 626.
127. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578
(1960); Malin & Ladenson, supra note 3, at 1192-94.
128. Cole, A Funny Thing, supra note 17, at 627.
129. Id. at 626.
130. Cf. id. at 628 (suggesting that because both union and management are repeat
players, courts should presume that labor arbitration adequately protects the rights of
employees).
131. Cole v. Burns Int'l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1476 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (characterizing
contractual rights).
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rights are creatures of public law-created by Congress and subject to
definition and modification only by Congress and the courts.
132
Further, the public has a legitimate interest in how those rights are
defined and enforced.133 In light of these differences between
contractual and statutory rights, the federal courts were slow to
embrace the proposition that arbitration could be an appropriate
vehicle for the resolution of federal statutory claims.'3
III. THE ROAD TO GILMER AND BEYOND: JUDICIAL TREATMENT
OF AGREEMENTS TO ARBITRATE FEDERAL STATUTORY CLAIMS
The Supreme Court first addressed the question of whether
claims arising under federal statutes should be subject to arbitration
in Wilko v. Swan,'135 in which the Court considered whether to enforce
an agreement to arbitrate a customer's damages claim against a
brokerage firm for violation of the Securities Act of 1933.136
Although the Court acknowledged that the claim fell within the terms
of the arbitration agreement between the customer and the brokerage
firm, the Court refused to enforce the agreement because it conflicted
with a provision of the Securities Act that prohibited any waiver of
compliance with its provisions. 37 Significantly, the Court was
especially skeptical of predispute arbitration agreements because
limited judicial review of arbitrated awards meant that investors
could not be confident that the proper law would be applied to the
facts of their cases in private arbitrations. 3 ' In the wake of the Wilko
decision, some federal courts relied on the rationale behind Wilko to
conclude that claims arising under federal statutes that promoted
important public policy goals should not be heard in private fora. 
1 39
132. Id. (characterizing statutory rights).
133. Id. (citing Estreicher, Arbitration Without Unions, supra note 107, at 777).
134. See infra note 379 (explaining that the Supreme Court first approved arbitration
of federal statutory claims almost sixty years after passage of the FAA).
135. 346 U.S. 427 (1953), overruled by Rodriquez De Quijas v. Shearson/American
Express Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
136. Id. at 428-29.
137. 1d at 434-35 (discussing Securities Act of 1933 § 14, 15 U.S.C. § 77(n) (1994)).
138. Id. at 435-37.
139. See Am. Safety Equip. Corp. v. Maguire, 391 F.2d 821, 827 (2d Cir. 1968)
(concluding that public policy concerns foreclosed the arbitration of an antitrust claim).
The rationale of American Safety was followed by many other courts. See, e.g., Beckman
Instruments, Inc. v. Technical Dev. Corp., 433 F.2d 55, 63 (7th Cir. 1970) (holding that
claims challenging the validity of U.S. patents are not arbitrable); Bache Halsey Stuart,
Inc. v. French, 425 F. Supp. 1231, 1232-34 (D.D.C. 1977) (holding that claims arising under
the Commodity Exchange Act are not arbitrable); Douglas E. Abrams, Arbitrability in
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In the landmark case of Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.,140 the
Supreme Court considered for the first time whether a mandatory
arbitration clause could bar employees from suing under federal
employment discrimination statutes. 141 After being fired from his job
as a drill operator, the plaintiff, Harrell Alexander, filed a grievance
for wrongful discharge under the terms of the CBA governing
relations between his union and his employer. 42 The union pursued
the grievance to arbitration, but the arbitrator found that Alexander
had been justly discharged. 143  During the grievance process,
Alexander, an African American, filed a charge of racial
discrimination under Title VII with the Colorado Civil Rights
Commission and the EEOCY4 After the EEOC concluded that there
was no reasonable cause to believe that Title VII had been violated, it
issued a right-to-sue letter.145 Alexander then filed a claim in federal
district court, but the court granted summary judgment in favor of the
employer on the ground that Alexander's claims had already been
submitted to binding arbitration. 46 The Tenth Circuit affirmed. 47
On appeal, the Supreme Court unanimously reversed, holding
that Alexander had not waived his Title VII claim by pursuing
arbitration under the nondiscrimination clause of his CBA.148  The
Court emphasized that contractual rights under a CBA and statutory
rights under Title VII are distinct, even if both sets of rights have
been violated by the same employer actions. 49 According to the
Court, each right should be vindicated in its appropriate forum: the
CBA rights in arbitration and the statutory rights in federal court.50
The Court also suggested that arbitration was an inappropriate forum
Recent Civil Rights Legislation: The Need for Amendment, 26 CONN. L. REV. 521, 529-31
(1994) (discussing the influence of American Safety).
140. 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
141. Id. at 38.
142. Id at 38-42. Alexander testified during the arbitration proceeding that his
discharge had been the result of race discrimination. Id. at 42.
143. Id. at 42.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 43.
146. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 346 F. Supp. 1012, 1019 (D. Colo. 1971),
affd, 466 F.2d 1209 (10th Cir. 1972) (per curiam), rev'd, 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
147. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 466 F.2d 1209, 1210 (10th Cir. 1972) (per
curiam), rev'd, 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
148. Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. at 43.
149. Id. at 49-50. The distinction between contractual rights and statutory rights was
especially clear in this case because the arbitration clause of the CBA governed only
differences between the company and the union about the "'meaning and application of
the provisions of this Agreement.' " Id at 40 n.3 (quoting the CBA).
150. Id. at 49-50.
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for statutory discrimination claims, noting that arbitrators were
relatively unfamiliar with the relevant law,' that the arbitration
process was beset with various procedural shortcomings,152 and that
arbitrators were not required to provide written opinions explaining
their reasoning.153 Finally, the Court noted one problem with the
arbitration of statutory claims that was unique to the collective
bargaining context: because the union has exclusive control over the
grievance process, individual employee rights may be jeopardized
when the statutory rights of the employee conflict with the union's
interests. 54 Although Gardner-Denver held only that arbitration of
contractual claims did not preclude subsequent litigation of statutory
claims arising out of the same facts, 55 the Court stated in sweeping
terms that employee rights under Title VII and similar statutes "may
not be waived prospectively."' 156 The Court further stated that in
enacting Title VII, Congress gave the federal courts "plenary
power"' 57 to enforce the statutory mandate and that public lawsuits by
individual plaintiffs helped to advance the public policy goal of
ending employment discrimination in the workplace. 58 For a decade
151. Id at 57.
152. Id. at 57-58. More specifically, the Court noted that when compared to federal
courts, arbitration proceedings produce an incomplete record, are not governed by
evidentiary rules, and may lack the safeguards provided by discovery, compulsory service
of process, cross-examination, and testimony under oath. Id.
153. Id- at 58. Several commentators have echoed the Gardner-Denver Court's
concerns that an arbitral forum does not allow for the effective vindication of the
employee's statutory rights. See, e.g., Cole, Incentives and Arbitration, supra note 5, at
472-83 (arguing that in the nonunion context, arbitration is structurally biased against
individual employees because employers are "repeat players" while individual employees
are "one-shot players"); William M. Howard, Arbitrating Employment Discrimination
Claims: Do You Really Have To? Do You Really Want To?, 43 DRAKE L. REv. 255,286-
88 (1994) (arguing that employees may be disadvantaged in arbitration due to the limited
discovery available, the lack of diversity in the pool of arbitrators, and the potentially
unpredictable rulings of arbitrators with minimal knowledge of employment
discrimination law); Stone, supra note 18, at 1036-37 (noting that employees may be
discouraged from attempting to vindicate their statutory rights when bound by arbitration
clauses that require them to pay half of the arbitrator's fees).
154. See Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. at 58 n.19 (citing J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S.
332, 338-39 (1944)); see also infra notes 205-13 and accompanying text (discussing
potential conflicts of interest between unions and individual employees complaining of
employment discrimination).
155. As the Supreme Court later observed, Gardner-Denver did not address "the
enforceability of an agreement to arbitrate statutory claims;" instead, it asked "whether
arbitration of contract-based claims precluded subsequent judicial resolution of statutory
claims." Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20,35 (1991).
156. Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. at 52.
157. Id. at 45.
158. Id. at 44-45.
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after the case was decided, Gardner-Denver stood for the proposition
that no employee (unionized or not) could be forced to arbitrate
statutory discrimination claims.15 9
During the 1980s, however, the Supreme Court became more
receptive to the arbitration of statutory claims. 6 In Moses H. Cone
Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp.,6' the Court first
signaled this new receptivity by announcing in dicta that section two
of the FAA evinced a "liberal federal policy favoring arbitration
agreements"' 62 and directed that "any doubts concerning the scope of
arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration. 1 63 The
seeds planted by Moses H. Cone developed into full flower in a series
of cases known as the "Mitsubishi Triology."'1 In Mitsubishi Motors
Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 65 the Court enforced an
agreement to arbitrate federal anti-trust claims.166 Following Moses
H. Cone, it held that the FAA requires courts to resolve ambiguities
in arbitration agreements in favor of arbitrability 67 The Court also
distanced itself from its earlier concerns that arbitration was an
inherently unsuitable forum for statutory claims,"6 and rejected
arguments that allowing the non-judicial resolution of antitrust claims
159. See Robert L. Duston, Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.: A Major Step
Forward for Alternative Dispute Resolution, or a Meaningless Decision?, 7 LAB. LAW. 823,
830-31 (1991). The Supreme Court followed Gardner-Denver in McDonald v. City of
West Branch, 466 U.S. 284, 292 (1984) (refusing to give estoppel effect to arbitration award
involving claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983), and Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys.,
Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 745 (1981) (authorizing a federal suit under the Fair Labor Standards
Act despite an employee's prior arbitration proceeding under a CBA).
160. For discussion of the "sea change" in the Court's attitude toward the arbitration of
statutory claims during the 1980s, see Stephen L. Hayford, Commercial Arbitration in the
Supreme Court 1983-95: A Sea Change, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 1, 21-32 (1996); Linda
R. Hirshman, The Second Arbitration Trilogy: The Federalization of Arbitration Law, 71
VA. L. REV. 1305, 1305-07, 1137-53 (1985).
161. 460 U.S. 1 (1983).
162. Id. at 24-25.
163. Id.
164. Moohr, supra note 2, at 411-12.
165. 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
166. Id. at 629. The Mitsubishi decision provoked a vigorous dissent by Justice
Stevens, which was joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall. See id. at 640-66 (Stevens,
J., dissenting). Justice Stevens would not have read the arbitration clause to include
statutory claims and argued that the FAA should not be construed to authorize the
arbitration of federal statutory claims. Id. at 641, 646 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
167. Id at 626 (stating that although the intent of the parties should govern the
interpretation of arbitration agreements, "those intentions are generously construed as to
issues of arbitrability").
168. Id. at 632-33. The Court declared that "[b]y agreeing to arbitrate a statutory
claim, a party does not forego the substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only
submits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum." Id at 628.
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would undermine the enforcement of antitrust laws. 169 It reasoned
that those goals were satisfied so long as plaintiffs could effectively
redress their individual injuries through arbitration.170  The Court
subsequently applied the reasoning of Mitsubishi to securities and
racketeering claims in Shearson/American Express, Inc. v.
McMahon17' and Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express,
Inc.172 The latter case overruled the Wilko decision as a relic of "the
old judicial hostility to arbitration."'73
In addition to adopting Moses H. Cone's presumption of
arbitrability in the interpretation of arbitration agreements, the
Mitsubishi Trilogy also articulated a presumption that if the parties
have agreed to arbitrate a statutory claim, that agreement should be
enforced. 74  The Court reasoned that because Congress had
announced a "liberal federal policy favoring arbitration" in the FAA,
only a clear expression of congressional intent to preclude arbitration
of statutory claims could override that policy.17 The Court also held
that the party arguing against enforcement of an arbitration
agreement on public policy grounds bears the burden of proving the
requisite congressional intent. 76  The practical effect of these
developments has been to blunt the force of arguments that public
policies external to an arbitration agreement render that agreement
unenforceable. 77  The Mitsubishi Trilogy, then, established
169. Id. at 634-37. The "chief tool in the antitrust scheme" is the threat of a treble
damage award to a private litigant. Id. at 635.
170. Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 637 ("And so long as the prospective litigant effectively
may vindicate its statutory cause of action in the arbitral forum, the statute will continue to
serve both its remedial and deterrent function.").
171. 482 U.S. 220,226 (1987).
172. 490 U.S. 477, 481 (1989).
173. Rodriquez, 490 U.S. at 480-81 (quoting Kulukundis Shipping Co. v. Amtorg
Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 978, 985 (2d Cir. 1942)).
174. See Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 626-28.
175. Id at 627-28 ("We must assume that if Congress intended the substantive
protection afforded by a given statute to include protection against waiver of the right to a
judicial forum, that intention will be deducible from text or legislative history." (citing
Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427,434-35 (1953)).
176. Rodriguez, 490 U.S. at 483; McMahon, 482 U.S. at 227.
177. Professor Geraldine Moohr has summarized the effect of the Mitsubishi Trilogy
by saying that it "limited consideration of the public policy goal of the statutes to
remediation and deterrence, changed the focus of analysis to the fairness of the arbitration
forum, and realigned the parties' burdens in litigating the enforceability of arbitration
agreements." Moohr, supra note 2, at 415.
The Court has also effectively foreclosed the argument that enforcing some
arbitration agreements would undermine state public policies. In Southland Corp. v.
Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984), the Supreme Court held that section 2 of the FAA fully
preempts any state statutes that purport to create rights that can be enforced only in a
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presumptions of arbitrability under the FAA both as to the
interpretation of arbitration clauses and as to their enforceability.
178
judicial forum. Id. at 16. In other words, after Southland, no state can create a statutory
right that will be enforceable only in court, at least so far as that right purport to govern
employment agreements within the scope of the FAA. Id. at 19 (Stevens, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part). But see id. at 21-36 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (arguing that
the FAA was not intended to have such broad preemptive effects on state law). While
Southland remains good law, its future is somewhat uncertain because at least four of the
Court's current Justices have voiced their disagreement with that decision. Justice
O'Connor's dissent in Southland was joined by Justice Rehnquist, see id. at 21, and
Justices Scalia and Thomas expressed their willingness to overturn Southland in a 1995
case. See Allied Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 284-85 (1995) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting); id. at 285-96 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
178. The changes effected by the Mitsubishi Trilogy were apparently motivated by at
least two factors: an increasing confidence in the fairness and utility of arbitration as a
quick and inexpensive way to resolve disputes, see Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 626-27 (noting
the past "judicial suspicion" of arbitration was no longer appropriate); id. at 634 (stating
that the Court would not presume that the parties to the arbitration agreement would be
unable to find "competent, conscientious, and impartial arbitrators"), and an increasing
willingness to encourage arbitration as a way to reduce the burgeoning caseloads of the
federal courts.
Many scholars have suggested that the Supreme Court's arbitration decisions over
the last twenty years have been driven more by a desire to clear federal dockets than by a
desire to enforce private, consensual agreements. See, e.g., IAN R. MACNEIL, AMERICAN
ARBITRATION LAW: REFORMATION, NATIONALIZATION, INTERNATIONALIZATION 172
(1992) (stating that a major motivation behind the Court's arbitration jurisprudence is
"docket-clearing pure and simple"); Reginald Alleyne, Statutory Discrimination Claims:
Rights "Waived" and Lost in the Arbitration Forum, 13 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 381, 385
(1996) (suggesting that the motive behind the Court's pro-arbitration decisions is a desire
to reduce judicial caseloads); Stephen J. Ware, Employment Arbitration and Voluntary
Consent, 25 HOFSTRA L. REv. 83, 138 (1996) (stating that the Supreme Court's decisions
are "largely consistent with the view that courts favor arbitration as a way to reduce their
caseloads whether or not parties have contracted for it"). This suggestion may be based
on a belief that docket-clearing must be the Court's motive because its aggressively pro-
arbitration FAA jurisprudence is inconsistent with prior case law, public policy, and the
text and legislative history of the FAA. See infra notes 309-24, 378-82 and accompanying
text (criticizing the Mitsubishi Trilogy as an unjustified judicial innovation). Scholars may
also find support for the docket-clearing theory in evidence that the early 1980s were
marked by widespread (and justified) concern about the increasing caseloads of the
federal courts, see, e.g., Harry T. Edwards, The Rising Work Load and Perceived
Bureaucracy of the Federal Courts: A Causation-Based Approach to the Search for
Appropriate Remedies, 68 IowA L. REv. 871, 873 (1983), and in evidence that the Court
was well aware of arbitration's potential for helping to manage federal dockets. See, e.g.,
Burger, supra note 3, at 276-77.
The Court's aggressive promotion of arbitration under the FAA may also have
been influenced by its hospitable stance toward labor arbitration. MACNEIL, supra, at 57-
58 (observing that the Court's positive view of labor arbitration has influenced its attitude
toward commercial arbitration); Nelson, supra note 92, at 303 (stating that in Moses H.
Cone the Court essentially transported the presumption of arbitrability developed in the
Steelworkers Trilogy from the collective bargaining context to commercial arbitration
under the FAA). Significantly, the Mitsubishi Court cited both Moses H. Cone and a
Steelworkers Trilogy case to support the claim that arbitration agreements should be
interpreted under a presumption of arbitrability. Mitsubishi, 415 U.S. at 626.
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In 1991, the Court applied the analytical framework developed in
the Mitsubishi Trilogy to an arbitration agreement that covered
statutory claims arising under the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act (ADEA).7 9 In Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.,8 ' the
employer required the plaintiff to register with the New York Stock
Exchange (NYSE) as a condition of his employment. 8' The NYSE
registration application contained a clause requiring the arbitration of
" 'any dispute, claim or controversy' " between Gilmer and his
employer that was required to be arbitrated under the rules of the
NYSE or any other organization with which Gilmer registered as part
of his securities work.' 2  Because NYSE Rule 347 provided for
arbitration of " '[a]ny controversy between a registered
representative and any member or member organization arising out
of the employment or termination of employment of such registered
representative,' " Gilmer had effectively agreed to arbitrate any
dispute that might arise between himself and Interstate/Johnson
Lane.183  Gilmer was fired at age sixty-two after six years of
employment and alleged age discrimination in a complaint to the
EEOC.184
Interstate/Johnson Lane moved to compel arbitration, but the
district court denied the motion by analogizing the case to Gardner-
Denver,' in which the Supreme Court had stated that an employee
could not prospectively waive his rights under Title VII.186 On
appeal, the Fourth Circuit claimed that the Mitsubishi Trilogy
established that agreements to arbitrate statutory claims should be
enforced unless the statute contains evidence of congressional intent
to preclude the waiver of a judicial forum.'17 Finding no such
evidence in the text, legislative history, or stated purposes of the
ADEA, the Fourth Circuit reversed and granted the motion to
compel arbitration. 88
179. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1994).
180. 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
181. Id- at 23.
182. Id. (quoting the NYSE registration application).
183. Id. (quoting NYSE Rule 347).
184. Id.
185. Id. at 24.
186. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36,51 (1974).
187. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 895 F.2d 195, 196-97 (4th Cir. 1990),
affd, 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
188. Id. at 203.
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On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed.189 Placing the case in
the context of its recent decisions favoring the arbitration of statutory
claims, 19° the Court reiterated that the FAA evinces a" 'liberal policy
favoring arbitration agreements,' "191 and that Gilmer bore the
burden of demonstrating that Congress had intended all ADEA
claims to be enforced in judicial fora.192 Like the Fourth Circuit, the
Supreme Court found no evidence of such congressional intent.1 93
The Court also dismissed Gilmer's challenges to the procedural
adequacy of arbitration procedures, stating that whatever shortcuts
such procedures contain when compared with their judicial analogs
are justified by the greater" 'simplicity, informality, and expedition of
arbitration.' "194 While acknowledging that inequality of bargaining
power might invalidate an arbitration agreement, the Court preferred
to evaluate such arguments on a case-by-case basis instead of treating
agreements to arbitrate statutory claims as per se invalid.1 95
The Court's reasoning in Gilmer raised obvious questions about
the continuing validity of Gardner-Denver. The Gardner-Denver
Court based its decision primarily on arguments that arbitration was
inconsistent with the public policies embodied in Title VII and that
arbitration was procedurally inadequate196 -arguments that the
Gilmer Court expressly rejected with respect to the plaintiff's ADEA
claim. Nevertheless, the Court distinguished Gardner-Denver on
three grounds. First, Gardner-Denver did not involve an agreement
189. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 35. Justice Stevens dissented on the ground that section one of
the FAA excludes all employment contracts from the scope of the FAA. Id at 38-42
(Stevens, J., dissenting) ("When the FAA was passed in 1925, I doubt that any legislator
who voted for it expected it to apply to statutory claims, to form contracts between parties
of unequal bargaining power, or to the arbitration of disputes arising out of the
employment relationship."). The majority refused to address the scope of the section 1
exclusion because the arbitration clause was not part of the employment contract between
Gilmer and Interstate/Johnson Lane. Id. at 25 n.2. Instead, the clause was contained in
Gilmer's securities registration application. Id
190. Id. at 26 ("It is by now clear that statutory claims may be the subject of an
arbitration agreement, enforceable pursuant to the FAA.").
191. Id- at 25 (quoting Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S.
1,24 (1983)).
192. Id. at 26.
193. Id. at 28.
194. 1d at 31 (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473
U.S. 614, 628 (1985)); see also id. at 34 n.5 (observing that the Gardner-Denver Court's
dim view of the arbitration process had been discredited by recent decisions).
195. Id at 33 ("Mere inequality in bargaining power ... is not a sufficient reason to
hold that arbitration agreements are never enforceable in the employment context."). In
any event, the Court saw little reason for concern about unequal bargaining power in
Gilmer. Id.
196. See supra notes 149-59 (discussing the Court's reasoning in Gardner-Denver).
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to arbitrate statutory claims-it merely held that arbitration of
contract claims does not preclude subsequent litigation of statutory
claims.197 Second, Gardner-Denver considered an arbitration clause
in a collective bargaining agreement, and hence had involved
concerns about the "tension between collective representation and
individual statutory rights" not present in Gilmer.95 Third, Gilmer
was decided under the FAA's liberal policy favoring arbitration,
while Gardner-Denver was not.'99
In the wake of Gilmer, courts have routinely enforced predispute
agreements to arbitrate statutory discrimination claims in individual
employment contracts.2' Indeed, many courts have held that section
118 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991°1 contains a congressional
endorsement of the trend toward arbitration of employment
discrimination claims.2°2  Where such agreements have not been
enforced, courts have tended to focus more on defects in contract
197. Id at 35. The Gardner-Denver Court stressed that although Alexander's charge
that his employer had violated a contractual promise not to discriminate was based on the
same facts as his statutory discrimination claim, the two causes of action were distinct.
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 49-50, 52 (1974). While the Gilmer
Court's narrow reading of the Gardner-Denver holding is correct, it ignores language in
the earlier case suggesting that an agreement to arbitrate Title VII rights should never be
enforced. See, e.g., id. at 60 n.21 ("Congress, in enacting Title VII, thought it necessary to
provide a judicial forum for the ultimate resolution of discriminatory employment claims.
It is the duty of courts to assure the full availability of this forum.").
198. Id.
199. Id Oddly, the Gilmer Court failed to acknowledge that there is also a strong
federal policy favoring arbitration agreements in CBAs. See supra notes 111-18 and
accompanying text (discussing the Steelworkers Trilogy). Indeed, the Gardner-Denver
Court explicitly acknowledged that policy while holding that it did not bar the plaintiff's
statutory discrimination claim. See Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. at 47. The Court's implicit
distinction between the pro-arbitration policies of the FAA and the Steelworkers Trilogy
may indicate that courts should be more willing to entertain public policy arguments
against the enforcement of arbitration clauses in the collective bargaining context than in
the context of individual employment contracts.
200. Gilmer involved an ADEA claim, but courts have extended its reasoning to other
employment discrimination claims as well. See, e.g., Seus v. John Nuveen & Co., 146 F.3d
175, 182 (3d Cir. 1998) (extending Gilmer to Title VII claims); Bercovitch v. Baldwin Sch.,
Inc., 133 F.3d 141, 149-50 (1st Cir. 1998) (extending Gilmer to ADA claims).
201. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 118, 105 Stat. 1071, 1081 (codified
as 42 U.S.C. § 1981 note (1994)) ("Where appropriate and to the extent authorized by law,
the use of alternative means of dispute resolution, including ... arbitration, is encouraged
to resolve disputes .... ).
202. See, e.g., Rosenberg v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 170 F.3d 1, 11
(1st Cir. 1999) (holding that the Civil Rights Act of 1991 does not bar predispute
agreements to arbitrate statutory employment discrimination claims); Seus, 146 F.3d at 183
(same). But see Duffield v. Robertson Stephens & Co., 144 F.3d 1182, 1199 (9th Cir. 1998)
(concluding that the Civil Rights Act of 1991 reflects congressional hostility to predispute
agreements to arbitrate statutory discrimination claims).
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formation than on inconsistencies with statutory policy.2 3 Yet,
despite the Gilmer Court's apparent repudiation of the public policy
reasoning in Gardner-Denver, all circuits except the Fourth to
consider the question have held that Gardner-Denver and its progeny
still govern in the collective bargaining context and have refused to
enforce union-negotiated waivers of the right to litigate statutory
discrimination claims.2°  Often, courts have reconstructed the
rationale behind Gardner-Denver by emphasizing potential conflicts
of interest between the union and the individual employee.205
203. See infra notes 289-92 and accompanying text (discussing decisions where courts
refused to compel arbitration because the employee had not received sufficient notice of
the agreement to arbitrate).
204. See Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int'l v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 199 F.3d 477, 484-85
(D.C. Cir. 1999) (following Gardner-Denver to hold that a union could not lawfully waive
employee's right to litigate claims under the FLSA), vacated and reh'g granted, No. 98-
7196, No. 98-7196, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 3756 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 9, 2000), reinstated en
banc, 211 F.3d 1312 (D.C. Cir. 2000), petition for cert. filed, 69 U.S.L.W. 3157 (U.S. Aug.
16, 2000) (No. 00-260); Albertson's, Inc. v. United Food and Commercial Workers Union,
157 F.3d 758, 761-62 (9th Cir. 1998) (following the Gardner-Denver/Barrentine line of
cases in holding that employees could litigate claims under the FLSA without resorting to
the grievance and arbitration procedures in their CBA); Penny v. United Parcel Serv., 128
F.3d 408, 414 (6th Cir. 1997) (holding that "an employee whose only obligation to
arbitrate is contained in a [CBA] retains the right to obtain a judicial determination of his
rights under a statute such as the ADA"); Brisentine v. Stone & Weber Eng'g Corp., 117
F.3d 519,525-27 (11th Cir. 1997) (holding that the arbitration clause in a CBA did not bar
the plaintiff's ADA claim); Harrison v. Eddy Potash, Inc., 112 F.3d 1437, 1452-54 (10th
Cir. 1997) (following Gardner-Denver in holding that the plaintiff was not required to
exhaust the arbitration procedures required by a CBA before litigating a Title VII claim);
Pryner v. Tractor Supply Co., 109 F.3d 354, 363 (7th Cir. 1996) (emphasizing that "the
union cannot consent for the employee by signing a [CBA]"); Varner v. Nat'l Super
Markets, Inc., 94 F.3d 1209, 1213 (8th Cir. 1996) (following Gardner-Denver in holding
that the plaintiff could bring Title VII claims despite a failure to exhaust arbitration
procedures under a CBA); Tran v. Tran, 54 F.3d 115, 118 (2d Cir. 1995) (following
Barrentine in holding that a CBA did not bind plaintiff to arbitrate her claim under the
FLSA before seeking relief in federal court). For overviews of how the circuits have
treated agreements to arbitrate statutory claims in the collective bargaining context, see
Ann C. Hodges, Protecting Unionized Employees Against Discrimination: The Fourth
Circuit's Misinterpretation of Supreme Court Precedent, 2 EMPLOYEE RTs. & EMP. POL'Y
J. 123, 130-40 (1998). See generally Marjorie A. Shields, Annotation, Enforceability of
Arbitration Clauses in Collective Bargaining Agreements As Regards Claims Under Federal
Civil Rights Statutes, 152 A.L.R. FED. 75 (1999) (collecting and discussing cases involving
CBA arbitration clauses barring employees from litigating federal statutory civil rights
claims in federal court).
The question of whether union-negotiated waivers of the right to a judicial forum
for federal employment discrimination claims should be enforced is beyond the scope of
this Note. For discussion, see, e.g., Cole, A Funny Thing, supra note 17, at 628-29
(concluding that union-negotiated waivers should be enforced); Hodges, supra, at 140-74
(arguing that courts should not enforce union-negotiated waivers); Turner, supra note 5, at
191-203 (same).
205. See, e.g., Pryner, 109 F.3d at 362-63. In Pryner, the Seventh Circuit emphasized
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These conflicts are a function of the character of unions as
majoritarian institutions. Once a majority of workers in a given
bargaining unit have voted to unionize, the union becomes the
exclusive bargaining representative of all the employees in that
unit2 -both those who voted for the union and those who did not.
20 7
Correlative to the union's role as exclusive bargaining agent for all
the members of the bargaining unit is the duty of fair representation,
which requires the union to "serve the interests of all members
without hostility or discrimination toward any, to exercise its
discretion with complete good faith and honesty, and to avoid
arbitrary conduct. '20 8  The duty of fair representation does not,
however, mean that the union must pursue every employee grievance
all the way to arbitration.2 9 Instead, the union has considerable
discretion about which claims to pursue, and may legitimately trade
off the interests of some members against others in order to promote
the greater good of the whole bargaining unit.210 If an employee
disagrees with the union's decision not to arbitrate her grievance, she
may sue the union for a breach of its duty of fair representation; but
such claims rarely succeed because the union has satisfied that duty as
long as it can show that it did not act arbitrarily, discriminatorily, or in
the union's exclusive control over the arbitration process, and observed that the public
policies underlying employment discrimination statutes are thwarted when union
majorities can effectively waive the rights of union minorities. See id- In Brisentine, the
Eleventh Circuit announced a test designed to resolve the potential conflict between
collective rights and individual representation. The court stated that mandatory
arbitration clauses do not bar lawsuits arising under federal statutes unless: (1) the
employee has agreed individually to the contract and its arbitration clause, (2) the
agreement explicitly authorizes the arbitrator to resolve federal statutory claims, and (3)
the employee retains the right to insist that her claim be arbitrated even if her union does
not wish to pursue arbitration. See Brisentine, 117 F.3d at 526-27.
206. See 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1994).
207. See Pryner, 109 F.3d at 362.
208. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 177 (1967). The duty of fair representation applies to
both the negotiation and administration of CBAs. Air Line Pilots Ass'n v. O'Neill, 499
U.S. 65, 67 (1991).
209. See Vaca, 386 U.S. at 191.
210. See Pryner, 109 F.3d at 362 (stating that the union "may take into account tactical
and strategic factors such as its limited resources and consequent need to establish
priorities, just as other 'prosecutors' must do, as well as its desire to maintain harmonious
relations among the workers and between them and the employer"); Michael C. Harper &
Ira C. Lupu, Fair Representation as Equal Protection, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1212, 1269 (1985)
(stating that employers sometimes settle several grievances favorably if the union is willing
to drop a small number of meritorious grievances, thereby sacrificing the interests of the
few to the greater good); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Pitfalls of Public Policy: The Case of
Arbitration Agreements, 22 ST. MARY'S L.J. 259, 311 (1990) (stating that a union may
sacrifice individual claims to the collective interest so long as its decision to do so can be
seen as an exercise of reasoned judgment).
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bad faith."' As a result of these doctrines, when the union's exclusive
control over the grievance procedure is combined with a mandatory
agreement to arbitrate statutory discrimination claims, some
aggrieved employees may be left without any forum in which they can
vindicate their statutory rights.l 2 Most circuits have found this result
unacceptable, and have reaffirmed the validity of Gardner-Denver on
the ground that the right of the individual to be free of employment
discrimination should not be compromised by the majoritarian
processes of collective bargaining? 13 In most of the country, then, the
rule today is that an individual can waive her own right to litigate
statutory discrimination claims, but her union cannot waive that right
for her.
The Fourth Circuit stands alone in holding that a CBA
arbitration clause can waive an individual employee's right to a
judicial forum for her federal employment discrimination claims.214 In
Austin v. Owens-Brockway Glass Container, Inc., 215 the plaintiff
sought to litigate Title VII and ADA claims in federal district court,
but the Fourth Circuit held that she was bound to arbitration 16 by
211. See Vaca, 386 U.S. at 193.
212. See Pryner, 109 F.3d at 362 (stating that "a worker who asks the union to grieve a
statutory violation cannot have great confidence either that it will do so or that if it does
not the courts will intervene and force it to do so"); Hodges, supra note 204, at 149
(observing that if a union-negotiated waiver of the right to a judicial forum for statutory
discrimination claims is enforceable, employee complaints of discrimination will not be
heard in any forum if the union declines to press those complaints all the way to
arbitration).
213. See, e.g., Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int'l v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 199 F.3d 477, 484
(D.C. Cir. 1999) (stating that under Gardner-Denver statutory rights against
discrimination must "remain exclusively within the individual's control"), vacated and
reh'g granted, No. 98-7196,2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 3756 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 9, 2000), reinstated
en banc, 211 F.3d 1312 (D.C. Cir. 2000), petition for cert. filed, 69 U.S.L.W. 3157 (U.S.
Aug. 16,2000) (No. 00-260).
214. Two district courts in the Second Circuit have also read Gilmer to imply that
Gardner-Denver no longer stands as an absolute bar to the enforcement of union-
negotiated waivers of the right to litigate statutory discrimination claims. Clarke v. UFI,
Inc., 98 F. Supp. 2d 320, 333 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (holding that the arbitrator's decision
pursuant to a CBA grievance procedure precluded the plaintiff from subsequent litigation
of a sexual harassment claim in federal court); Almonte v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of N.Y.,
Inc., 959 F. Supp. 569, 574 (D. Conn. 1997) (enforcing union-negotiated agreement to
arbitrate claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and rejecting a "per se rule barring enforcement of
CBA mandated arbitration of individual statutory claims"). These cases stand in
considerable tension, however, with the Second Circuit's decision in Tran v. Tran, 54 F.3d
115 (2d Cir. 1995). In Tran, the Second Circuit affirmed the continuing validity of
Barrentine and Gardner-Denver in holding that a CBA arbitration clause did not require
the plaintiff to submit claims under the FLSA to arbitration. Id. at 117-18.
215. 78 F.3d 875 (4th Cir. 1996).
216. Id. at 877.
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virtue of a clause in her union's CBA that called for final, binding
arbitration of "'all disputes' " under the CBA.2 1 Significantly, the
CBA's nondiscrimination clause pledged that both the union and the
employer would "'comply with all laws preventing discrimination
against any employee,'" including the ADA.218 Invoking the strong
federal policies favoring labor arbitration,219 the Fourth Circuit
rejected the argument that Gilmer did not apply to collective
bargaining agreements. The court reasoned that just as a union can
waive rights protected by the National Labor Relations Act,"0 it can
also waive the right to pursue statutory claims in a judicial forum. 2
The court also rejected arguments that the legislative history behind
the ADA and the Civil Rights Act of 199112 signaled Congress's
intent to preclude predispute agreements to arbitrate statutory
discrimination claims. 3 Summing up its position, the court stated
217. Id. at 879-80 (quoting the CBA).
218. Id. at 879 (quoting the CBA).
219. Id. at 879. The court appealed to the pro-arbitration policies established in the
Steelworkers Trilogy, but did not rely on the FAA policy favoring arbitration because
prior circuit precedent indicated that the FAA does not apply to CBAs. Id. (citing
Domino Sugar Corp. v. Sugar Workers Local Union 392, 10 F.3d 1064, 1067 (4th Cir.
1993)).
220. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1994).
221. Austin, 78 F.3d at 885. This aspect of the court's reasoning has prompted
criticism. See, e.g., Hodges, supra note 204, at 142-43 (criticizing the Fourth Circuit for
ignoring Gardner-Denver's distinction between contractual rights conferred on the union
collectively and statutory rights conferred on individual employees); Andrew J. Ciancia,
Note and Comment, Mandatory Arbitration Clauses in the Collective Bargaining Context.
The Fourth Circuit's Misapplication of Gilmer in Austin v. Owens-Brockway Glass
Container, Inc., 18 J.L. & COM. 115, 129 (1998) (stating that Austin failed to recognize that
"a collective bargaining agreement can become 'involuntary' when a minority of
employees are forced to waive certain rights because they are outnumbered"). But see
Cole, A Funny Thing, supra note 17, at 594-95 (arguing that the Austin court reached the
correct result and that Gardner-Denver should be overruled).
222. Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 118, 105 Stat. 1071, 1081 (1991) (codified as § 1981 note
(1994)) ("Where appropriate and to the extent authorized by law, the use of alternative
means of dispute resolution, including ... arbitration, is encouraged to resolve disputes
.... "); see supra notes 201-02 and accompanying text (noting that many courts have read
the Civil Rights Act of 1991 as an endorsement of predispute employment arbitration).
223. Austin, 78 F.3d at 881-82. The House Committee Report on the Civil Rights Act,
written before the Gilmer decision, stated that:
the use of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms is intended to
supplement, not supplant, the remedies provided by Title VII. Thus,
for example, the Committee believes that any agreement to submit
disputed issues to arbitration, whether in the context of a collective
bargaining agreement or in an employment contract, does not preclude
the affected person from seeking relief under the enforcement
provisions of Title VII. This view is consistent with the Supreme
Court's interpretation of Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.
H.R. REP. No. 102-40, pt.1, at 97 (1991) reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 635 (Sup.
[Vol. 79
2000] ARBITRATION OF STATUTORY CLAIMS
whether an arbitration agreement forms part of an individual
employment contract or a CBA does not matter: "So long as the
agreement is voluntary, it is valid, and we are of the opinion that it
should be enforced.
' 2 4
The Supreme Court granted certiorari' on a Fourth Circuit
case, Wright v. Universal Maritime Service Corp., 6 in order to resolve
the circuit split over the continuing validity of Gardner-Denver. In
Wright, the CBA's arbitration clause encompassed " 'all matters
affecting wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of
employment.' 7 The Fourth Circuit had followed Austin in holding
that this clause "easily" encompassed the plaintiff's ADA claim,
noting that the arbitration clause in Gilmer was equally broad and
that any other interpretation would contradict the federal policy
favoring alternative means of dispute resolution.l Ultimately, the
Supreme Court did not reach the issue of whether a union-negotiated
waiver of the right to raise statutory discrimination claims in a judicial
forum is enforceable because the Court held that no such waiver had
occurred. 229
The Court acknowledged that arbitration clauses in CBAs should
be read in the light of a "presumption of arbitrability,"' 0 but did not
apply that presumption to the arbitration clause in Wright because the
Does. No. Y 1.1/8:102-40/pt.1). The House Committee Report on the ADA contains
nearly identical language. See H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt.3, at 76-77 (1990) reprinted in
1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 499 (Sup. Does. No. Y 1.1/8:101-48/pt.3). The Fourth Circuit
found this legislative history unconvincing compared to the apparent endorsement of
arbitration in the statutory text. See Austin, 78 F.3d at 882 (citing Justice Scalia's opinion
in Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 188, 191-92 (1988): "Committee reports, floor
speeches, and even colloquies between Congressman... are frail substitutes for bicameral
vote upon the text of a law and its presentment to the President."). For reviews and
assessments of the relevant legislative history of the ADA and the Civil Rights Act of
1991, see Abrams, supra note 139, at 551-84; Grodin, supra note 5, at 30-35; see also supra
note 202 (listing cases interpreting the pro-arbitration language in the ADA and the Civil
Rights Act of 1991).
224. Austin, 78 F.3d at 885. Judge Hall dissented on the ground that the difference
between the individual employment contract in Gilmer and the CBA in Austin made "all
the difference." Id. at 886-87 (Hall, J., dissenting). In his view, Gardner-Denver, not
Gilmer, was the proper rule of decision for cases involving CBAs. Id. (Hall, J., dissenting).
225. 522 U.S. 1146 (1998).
226. No. 96-2850, 1997 WL 422869 (per curiam) (unpublished decision).
227. Id. at *2 (quoting the CBA).
228. Id. (citing Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-
25 (1983)).
229. Wright v. Universal Mar. Serv. Corp., 525 U.S. 70,77 (1998).
230. Id. at 78 (quoting AT&T Techs., Inc. v. Communications Workers, 475 U.S. 643,
650 (1986)). The Court noted that there is also a presumption of arbitrability under the
FAA, but because the Fourth Circuit had not relied on the FAA in its decision, the Court
declined to address the question whether the FAA applies to CBAs. Id at 77-78 n.1.
272 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 79
presumption extends only as far as its principal rationale, which is
that arbitrators are better than judges at interpreting the terms of
CBAs.231 The Court, however, did not stop at removing the
presumption of arbitrability. 23 Instead, it held that any union-
negotiated waiver of an employee's right to a judicial forum for
federal employment discrimination claims must be clear and
unmistakable .33  The Court stated that Gardner-Denver at a
minimum implies that the right to a federal judicial forum is
important enough to be protected against union waivers that are
"less-than-explicit." 4  Applying the new "clear and unmistakable"
standard to the facts in Wright, the Court concluded that the CBA's
arbitration clause was not explicit enough to waive the plaintiffs right
to a judicial forumY5 While acknowledging that the Fourth Circuit
was correct in analogizing the CBA arbitration clause to the equally
broad clause considered in Gilmer, the Court emphasized that the
"clear and unmistakable" standard did not apply to Gilmer because
that case involved only an individual's waiver of his own statutory
rightsl 6
231. Id. at 78 (citing AT&T Technologies, 475 U.S. at 650). The Court found support
for its position in the text of the LMRA, which endorses "'a method agreed upon by the
parties'" as the preferred route to settling grievances arising from the "'application or
interpretation of an existing [CBA].'" Id. (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 173(d) (1994)). The Court
also observed that even if a CBA made compliance with the ADA a contractual term, the
ultimate issue would remain one of federal statutory law; therefore, the presumption of
arbitrability would not apply. Id. at 79.
232. See id. ("Not only is petitioner's statutory claim not subject to a presumption of
arbitrability; we think any CBA requirement to arbitrate it must be particularly clear.").
233. Id. at 79-80. The Court relied on Metropolitan Edison Co. v. NLRB, 460 U.S. 693
(1983), in adopting the "clear and unmistakable" standard. Wright, 525 U.S. at 79-80. In
Metropolitan Edison, the employer had disciplined union officials more severely than rank
and file union members for their participation in an unlawful work stoppage. See
Metropolitan Edison, 460 U.S. at 695. The Court held that this discriminatory treatment
violated section 8(a)(3) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1994). See id. at 710. In
rejecting the employer's argument that the Union had waived the protections afforded to
its officials by section 8(a)(3), the Court acknowledged that a union may waive statutory
rights, but held that any such waiver must be clear and unmistakable. Id. at 705-08.
234. Wright, 525 U.S. at 80.
235. Id. The arbitration clause did not clearly encompass federal statutory claims, nor
was there a clear incorporation of the ADA's legal standards into the contract. Id. The
Fourth Circuit has clarified the test in Wright to require either (1) an arbitration clause
specifically stating that federal statutory claims are subject to binding arbitration, or (2) an
explicit incorporation of the statute into the CBA. See Brown v. ABF Freight Sys., Inc.,
183 F.3d 319, 321-22 (4th Cir. 1999) (citing Carson v. Giant Food, Inc., 175 F.3d 325, 331
(4th Cir. 1999)). Incorporation of the statute into the CBA cannot be accomplished
simply by inserting clauses declaring an intent not to perform acts that violate the statute.
Id at 322.
236. Wright, 525 U.S. at 80-81.
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IV. BROWN AND WAFFLE HOUSE REVISITED: SOME WORKERS
ARE MORE EQUAL THAN OTHERS
When examined in light of Wright, the Fourth Circuit's refusal to
enforce the arbitration clause in Brown was clearly correct. The
arbitration clause covered "'all grievances or questions of
interpretation arising under' " the CBA-a clause too broad and
general to satisfy the "clear and unmistakable" standard. 7 Similarly,
the nondiscrimination clause included a pledge not to perform
discriminatory acts " 'prohibited by law,' " including those acts
prohibited by the ADA."8 The court correctly held that this language
was insufficient to constitute "explicit incorporation" under Wright,
finding a "legally dispositive" difference between "an agreement not
to commit discriminatory acts that are prohibited by law and an
agreement to incorporate, in toto, the anti-discrimination statutes that
prohibit those acts."'239
As Brown illustrates, the "clear and unmistakable" standard for
union-negotiated waivers of the right to sue under federal
employment discrimination statutes provides significant protection
for union employees. Very few CBA arbitration clauses meet that
standard.240 Indeed, some commentators have suggested that unions
would be extremely unlikely to agree to an explicit waiver of the
litigation rights of the workers they represent.241 The reasons for this
237. Brown, 183 F.3d at 320 (quoting the CBA).
238. Id. (quoting the CBA).
239. Id. at 322.
240. Nearly every court applying the Wright standard has failed to find a union-
negotiated waiver of an employee's right to litigate statutory discrimination claims. In
addition to Brown and Carson in the Fourth Circuit, see, e.g., Rogers v. N.Y. Univ., 220
F.3d 73, 77 (2d Cir. 2000) (holding that the CBA's arbitration clause did not clearly and
unmistakably waive an employee's right to a judicial forum for her claims under the ADA
and the Family and Medical Leave Act); Bratten v. SSI Servs., Inc., 185 F.3d 625, 631-32
(6th Cir. 1999) (holding that a CBA's arbitration clause did not clearly and unmistakably
waive an employee's right to a judicial forum for ADA claims); Osuala v. Cmty. Coll., No.
CIV. A. 00-98, 2000 WL 1146623, at *4 (E.D. Pa. 2000) (mem.) (holding that the CBA did
not contain a clear and unmistakable waiver of an employee's right to litigate a Title VII
claim). But see Clarke v. UFI, Inc., 98 F. Supp. 2d 320, 333 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (holding that
a CBA arbitration clause clearly and unmistakably waived an employee's right to a
judicial forum for sexual harassment claims under Title VII).
241. Hodges, supra note 204, at 151 n.167 (stating that unions have no reason to seek
such waivers and many reasons to avoid them, including avoiding exposure to liability
claims for breaches of the duty of fair representation); see also Cole, A Funny Thing, supra
note 17, at 608-09 (observing that unions would have "little incentive" to agree to
arbitrate statutory discrimination claims because such an agreement might expose them to
both Title VII liability and to claims for breach of the duty of fair representation).
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are twofold. First, unions have sufficient bargaining power to protect
themselves against unwanted waivers-a union will agree to such a
waiver only when the waiver advances its interests 24 Second, unions
will rarely want to waive employee litigation rights, for they have
compelling reasons not to agree to serve as the exclusive agent for
statutory discrimination claims.
To make the second point vivid, imagine that a union has clearly
and unmistakably waived the employees' right to a judicial forum for
their federal employment discrimination claims. An employee brings
a complaint of disability discrimination to the union and asks the
union to seek arbitration, but the union believes the claim has little
merit. Further, imagine that the union is in the process of pursuing
several other grievances that it believes are both more meritorious
than the disability discrimination claim and more likely to produce
long term benefits to all the employees in the bargaining unit. In such
a situation, all of the union's options have significant costs.
The union could simply decline to pursue the disability
discrimination claim, but that option carries with it the risk that the
disgruntled employee will sue the union for a breach of its duty of fair
representation (DFR).24 3 Although DFR suits are not easy for the
employee to win, they can be very expensive to defend244 and still
more costly to lose. 45 Indeed, at least one commentator has
suggested that unions are so cowed by the prospect of DFR suits that
they will prosecute even the weakest employee complaints all the way
to arbitration. 46 Adopting such a policy would free the union from
242. Cf. Richard A. Bales, The Discord Between Collective Bargaining and Individual
Employment Rights: Theoretical Origins and a Proposed Solution, 77 B.U. L. REV. 687,
688 (1997) (explaining that federal labor law is premised on the assumption that unionized
workers should have enough bargaining power to engage in meaningful negotiation over
the terms and conditions of their employment).
243. Pryner v. Tractor Supply Co., 109 F.3d 354, 362 (7th Cir. 1997) ("[I]f the union
arbitrarily refuses to prosecute a grievance, let alone refuses on racial or other invidious
grounds to do so, the worker can bring a suit against the union for breach of its duty of fair
representation .... "); see also supra notes 208-11 and accompanying text (discussing the
duty of fair representation). Declining to pursue an employment discrimination complaint
might also subject the union to Title VII liability. See Cole, A Funny Thing, supra note 17,
at 607-09.
244. See Stanley J. Schwartz, Different Views of the Duty of Fair Representation, 34
LAB. L.J. 415, 425-26 (1983) (stating that the cost of defending one DFR suit exceeds the
cost of arbitrating several grievances of dubious merit).
245. See Turner, supra note 5, at 183 (quoting Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424
U.S. 554, 567 (1976)) (stating that a finding that a union breached its duty of fair
representation has serious consequences for both the union and the employer because it
"undermines the integrity of the arbitral process").
246. Schwartz, supra note 244, at 424.
[Vol. 79
ARBITRATION OF STATUTORY CLAIMS
the specter of DFR suits, but it too has serious drawbacks. Pursuing a
statutory discrimination claim can be costly even in an arbitral forum,
and may pose significant strains on union resources. 247  More
fundamentally, a policy of automatic arbitration for discrimination
claims is inconsistent with unions' traditional discretionary approach
to arbitration.248 The Supreme Court has recognized that a union's
discretionary authority to decide which grievances should be
arbitrated is crucial to its role as the exclusive bargaining agent for
the employees it represents.249 Being able to abandon some claims in
order to increase its chance of success on other claims is part of the
union's power,20 and giving up that power would limit the union's
ability to promote employee interests. In the hypothetical situation
being considered here, aggressively prosecuting the disability
discrimination grievance would not serve the good of the bargaining
unit as a whole.
This example suggests that unions that agree to mandatory
arbitration of employment discrimination claims will often find
themselves between the proverbial rock and a hard place. Most
unions have apparently concluded that such an agreement would
cause more trouble than it is worthy21 It is possible, then, that as a
practical matter the "clear and unmistakable" standard will all but
eliminate the mandatory arbitration of statutory employment
247. Hodges, supra note 204, at 157-58 (noting the possible expense of obtaining the
expert witnesses and sophisticated statistical analysis that are sometimes necessary to
prosecute employment discrimination claims); Turner, supra note 5, at 197 (observing that
unions that take on the responsibility of handling statutory discrimination claims might
have to reallocate scarce resources in ways that do not maximize the well-being of the
bargaining unit).
248. Turner, supra note 5, at 196.
249. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 191-92 (1967). The Court stated that a regime of
mandatory arbitration would undermine the employer's trust in the union's authority and
might so overburden the arbitration process that it would no longer be able to function
effectively. Id at 192.
250. See supra note 210 and accompanying text (discussing the union's right to sacrifice
the interests of some bargaining unit members for the good of the whole).
251. See supra note 240 (observing that the case law suggests that unions rarely make
clear and unmistakable waivers of the right to a judicial forum for statutory discrimination
claims). The case law also indicates that unions sometime encourage employees to pursue
their employment discrimination claims in court rather than through the CBA grievance
process. See Turner, supra note 5, at 196 & n.354 (citing Wright v. Universal Mar. Serv.
Corp., 525 U.S. 70, 74 (1998) (stating that the union advised the plaintiff employee to file
his ADA claim in court) and Bratten v. SSI Servs., Inc., 185 F.3d 625, 629 (6th Cir. 1999)
(stating that the union decided not to pursue an ADA claim because it believed that such
claims were better resolved in federal court)).
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discrimination claims for unionized workers even in the Fourth
Circuit 25'
Applying the "clear and unmistakable" standard would also lead
to a different result in Waffle House. 3 But, of course, that standard
does not apply to arbitration agreements involving nonunionized
employees. 4 Broad but nonspecific arbitration clauses in individual
employment contracts are routinely enforced under the presumption
of arbitrability established in MitsubishiPs Indeed, Waffle House can
be interpreted as extending that presumption to the point of finding a
valid contract where most other courts would not. 6 Current Fourth
Circuit practice, then, leaves unionized employees in a far better
position to enforce their federal statutory rights against employment
discrimination than nonunionized employees?57  Moreover, the
disparity between the unionized and nonunionized is even greater in
other circuits, where even clear and unmistakable union-negotiated
252. The power of the "clear and unmistakable" standard can be illustrated by
observing that Austin almost certainly would have been decided differently under that
standard. The arbitration clause in Austin was extremely broad and nonspecific, requiring
simply that "'any disputes'" under the CBA be handled through a grievance procedure
culminating in final, binding arbitration. Austin v. Owens-Brockway Glass Container,
Inc., 78 F.3d 875, 879-80 (4th Cir. 1996); supra text accompanying note 217. Further, the
nondiscrimination clause simply pledged compliance with anti-discrimination laws,
including the ADA. Id.; supra text accompanying note 218. Neither clause would suffice
to waive the litigation rights of unionized employees under the "clear and unmistakable"
standard employed in Wright and Brown.
253. The arbitration clause purported to cover "'any dispute or claim concerning
Applicant's employment with Waffle House.'" EEOC v. Waffle House, 193 F.3d 805, 814
(4th Cir. 1999) (King, J., dissenting) (quoting the Waffle House employment application),
petition for cert. filed, 68 U.S.L.W. 3726 (U.S. Oct. 2,2000) (No. 99-1823). This language is
too broad to constitute an explicit waiver of the right to litigate statutory claims.
Furthermore, nothing in the arbitration clause could be read to incorporate the ADA by
reference. See id. at 814 n.1 (King, J., dissenting) (reproducing the text of the arbitration
clause).
254. Wright v. Universal Mar. Serv. Corp., 525 U.S. 70, 80-81 (1998) (stating that the
"clear and unmistakable" standard does not apply to individual employment contracts like
the one at issue in Gilmer). Courts have uniformly rejected arguments that the "clear and
unmistakable" standard should be extended beyond the collective bargaining context.
See, e.g., Williams v. Imhoff, 203 F.3d 758, 763-64 (10th Cir. 2000); Walker v. Carnival
Cruise Lines, 63 F. Supp. 2d 1083, 1090 (N.D. Cal. 1999); Bosinger v. Phillips Plastics
Corp., 57 F. Supp. 2d 986, 990-91 (S.D. Cal. 1999).
255. See supra note 80 (listing cases requiring arbitration under such clauses).
256. See Waffle House, 193 F.3d at 817 (King, J., dissenting) (observing that the
majority's holding that Baker and Waffle House had agreed to arbitrate their employment
dispute conflicted with the "fundamental principles of contract law").
257. But cf. Bales, supra note 242, at 690 (suggesting that because many state laws
granting individual employment rights are preempted by section 301 of the LMRA,
unionized employees are effectively deprived of those rights and hence are left with fewer
workplace rights than nonunionized employees).
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waivers of the right to litigate statutory discrimination claims remain
unenforceable under Gardner-Denver.25
This disparity appears ironic when one considers that collective
bargaining and statutory grants of individual employment rights
represent two distinct strategies for protecting the rights of workers.5 9
The collective bargaining model rests on the premise that if
employees organize effectively and gain sufficient bargaining power
to hold their own with employers, the terms of the employment
relationship may be left entirely to the contractual agreements
between the parties.26 Statutory employment rights, on the other
hand, are designed to take certain rights off the bargaining table.261
Employment discrimination statutes are meant to confer on
employees an absolute right to be free of discrimination that cannot
be compromised by the superior bargaining power of employers.262
Such statutory rights are most important where employees lack the
bargaining power to protect themselves through the give and take of
negotiation.263 Yet, in the wake of Gilmer, individual employees
routinely waive their statutory right to a judicial forum for their
employment discrimination claims via arbitration clauses that are
presented on a "take it or leave it" basis.2 4 Sometimes, as in Waffle
House, the employee has no meaningful notice that she has
relinquished her right to litigate statutory discrimination claims. 265
258. See supra note 204 and accompanying text.
259. Bales, supra note 242, at 688-89 (describing collective bargaining and individual
employment rights as contrasting approaches to workplace governance).
260. Id. at 745-46 (stating that the NLRA created a model of "industrial pluralism"
under which "[e]mployers and employees, roughly coequal, jointly negotiate and enforce
an agreement that establishes the terms and conditions of employment").
261. See id at 689.
262. Cf. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 51 (1974) ("Title VII's
strictures are absolute and represent a congressional command that each employee be free
from discriminatory practices.").
263. See Estreicher, Arbitration Without Unions, supra note 107, at 782 (stating that
legislation protecting workers reflects "dissatisfaction with the outcomes of private
bargaining"); Stone, supra note 18, at 1043 (stating that legislatures create statutory
employment rights when they believe that workers cannot protect themselves through
bargaining with employers).
264. See Stone, supra note 18, at 1036 (observing that agreements to arbitrate statutory
rights in the nonunion setting are "particularly problematic" because "[m]any pre-hire
arbitral agreements are blatant contracts of adhesion").
265. Several factors point to the insufficiency of the employee's notice in Waffle House:
(1) the broad but nonspecific language of the arbitration clause; (2) the fact that the clause
was printed in very small type; and (3) the fact that it was not part of the offer and
acceptance that created the employment contract between Baker and Waffle House.
EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc. 193 F.3d 805, 814-18 & n.1 (4th Cir. 1999) (King, J.,
dissenting), petition for cert. filed, 68 U.S.L.W. 3726 (U.S. Oct. 2, 2000) (No. 99-1823).
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In contrast, unionized workers at least enjoy the benefits of
having the terms of their employment negotiated by representatives
who have bargaining power that is roughly equal to-or at least in the
same ballpark as-that of their employer.266  Further, those
representatives are constrained to serve the interests of bargaining
unit members by a duty of fair representation.267 It seems, then, that
in the post-Gilmer world unionized workers with the bargaining
power to protect their interests through contract rights are more
secure in the benefits of their federal statutory employment rights
than those nonunionized employees who are most dependent on
statutory rights to protect their interests from abuses of economic
power.
The explanation for the present situation is apparent from the
earlier examination of the Supreme Court's developing jurisprudence
under the FAA and the LMRA. As acknowledged by the Supreme
Court in Wright, both federal labor laws and the FAA express public
These factors suggest that Baker had no notice that he had agreed to arbitrate anything,
let alone to arbitrate federal statutory claims. Another particularly egregious example of
illusory consent to mandatory arbitration agreements is Lang v. Burlington Northern R.R.,
835 F. Supp. 1104 (D. Minn. 1993), in which the court enforced a mandatory arbitration
agreement which had been unilaterally adopted by the employer and mailed to current
employees. The court reasoned that "continued employment, with knowledge of the [new
arbitration agreement], constituted acceptance of the offer and provided the necessary
consideration to bind the parties." Id. at 1106.
266. Justice Goldberg argued that truly voluntary agreements to arbitrate were
essential to the integrity of the process. Arthur J. Goldberg, A Supreme Court Justice
Looks at Arbitration, 20 ARB. J. 13, 16 (1965). He observed that arbitration agreements
are "genuinely voluntary" when reached between commercial concerns or in the collective
bargaining context where unions and employers possess "an equality, more or less, of
bargaining power." Id. at 16. In contrast, Justice Goldberg cautioned that concerns about
voluntariness may be significant when "an arbitration clause appears as 'boiler plate' in an
installment sales contract, a lease or other document where bargaining power may be
unequal." Id.
It may be objected, however, that the individual worker does not meaningfully
consent to arbitration in either the union or the nonunion context. Employers unilaterally
make the decision to choose arbitration over traditional litigation in the nonunion context,
while unions and employers reach that decision bilaterally through the collective
bargaining process. In either case, the individual worker is shut out. Yet if this
characterization is accurate, one would expect the decisions reached through union-
employer negotiation to serve the interests of employees more reliably than the unilateral
decisions of employers. Cf. David E. Feller, Compulsory Arbitration of Statutory
Discrimination Claims Under a Collective Bargaining Agreement: The Odd Case of Caesar
Wright, 16 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 53, 81 (1998) (suggesting that it would be odd for
the Supreme Court to hold that "a union and an employer could not agree to a result that
an employer could impose unilaterally in the absence of a union").
267. See supra notes 208-11 and accompanying text (discussing the duty of fair
representation).
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policies favoring the arbitration of (at least some) disputes.21 Both
policies were initially designed to facilitate the resolution in a private
forum of contractual disputes between parties of roughly equal
bargaining power.269 However, the judicial glosses on these policies
have now diverged. Individual employment contracts falling under
the FAA are interpreted in light of a judicial presumption of
arbitrability: all doubts about whether a disputed matter falls within
the scope of an arbitration clause are resolved in favor of inclusion.270
The result is that relatively vague arbitration clauses in individual
employment contracts are often held to compel arbitration of
statutory discrimination claims271
In contrast, the presumption of arbitrability stemming from
federal labor policy has never been extended beyond its original
context 72 As noted in Wright, that presumption's application is co-
extensive with its rationale-where arbitrators are in no better
position than the courts to correctly resolve the claims at issue, the
presumption disappears273 Moreover, the Supreme Court now
268. Wright v. Universal Mar. Serv. Corp., 525 U.S. 70,77-80 (1998).
269. See supra notes 119-31 (discussing the parallels between commercial arbitration
and labor arbitration).
270. See Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25
(1983). Furthermore, most individual employment contracts fall under the FAA because
most courts narrowly interpret the FAA's section 1 exclusion. See supra notes 99-107 and
accompanying text (discussing the controversy concerning how broadly one should read
the section 1 exclusion from the scope of the FAA).
271. See, e.g., Williams v. Katten, Muchin & Zavis, 837 F. Supp. 1430, 1432-33 (N.D.
Ill. 1993) (invoking the presumption of arbitrability to justify holding that a clause
requiring arbitration of "[a]ny controversy or claim arising out of or relating to any
provision of this Agreement or any other document or agreement referred to herein"
encompassed the plaintiff's Title VII claim); supra note 80 (citing other cases). Compare
McCrea v. Copeland, 945 F. Supp. 879, 882 (D. Md. 1996) (invoking the presumption of
arbitrability to hold that a clause in an individual employment contract requiring
arbitration of all disputes "'relating to this Agreement'" encompassed a statutory
discrimination claims), with Martin Marietta v. Md. Comm'n on Human Relations, 38 F.3d
1392, 1402 (4th Cir. 1994) (holding that a clause in a CBA requiring arbitration of disputes
involving the "'interpretation or application'" of the CBA did not encompass the
plaintiff's disability discrimination claim).
272. In Gardner-Denver, the Court acknowledged the pro-arbitration policies of
federal labor law, but declined to extend them beyond their original context. See
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 46 n.6 (1974). The Court did not attempt
to argue that the nondiscrimination clause in the CBA should be construed generously to
incorporate federal employment discrimination statutes, nor did it argue that the federal
policy favoring labor arbitration could trump Congress's choice to create a federal cause
of action so that private individuals could promote the public policy of ending
employment discrimination. See id. (acknowledging the pro-arbitration policies
announced in the Steelworkers Trilogy but finding them insufficient to prevent the plaintiff
from litigating his discrimination claims in federal court).
273. Wright v. Universal Mar. Serv. Corp., 525 U.S. 70,78-79 (1998).
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requires that union-negotiated waivers of the right to litigate
statutory discrimination claims be clear and unmistakable. 74 As a
result, courts rarely find such waivers and unionized employees may
vindicate their statutory employment rights in federal court.
V. THE LIMITS OF PRIVATE JUSTICE: How COURTS CAN BETTER
PROTECT THE STATUTORY RIGHTS OF NONUNIONIZED EMPLOYEES
To understand how current doctrine on the arbitrability of
statutory discrimination claims arose, however, is a far cry from
endorsing that doctrine. As Waffle House illustrates, the statutory
employment rights of nonunionized employees are too vulnerable to
employer abuses under the current legal regime. The Supreme Court
currently has a perfect opportunity 75 to remedy this situation by
affirming the Ninth Circuit's decision in Circuit City Stores, Inc. v.
Adams 6  The Adams decision followed Craft v. Campbell Soup
Co. 277 in holding that the FAA does not apply to arbitration clauses in
employment contracts.2 78 If the Supreme Court were to adopt the
reasoning of Craft and Adams, the federal courts would rarely have
the authority to compel arbitration of federal employment
discrimination claims. Gilmer would survive, but only as a shadow of
its former self. It would control only those cases where the
arbitration clause binding an employee is not contained in his
employment contract.2 79
The Ninth Circuit's interpretation of the FAA is both well-
reasoned and amply supported by scholarly commentary. 210 The
court reasoned that because the scope of the Commerce Clause
274. 1L
275. See supra notes 105-06 and accompanying text (explaining that the Supreme
Court has granted certiorari and heard oral arguments on a Ninth Circuit case addressing
the scope of the FAA's section 1 exclusion).
276. 194 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 1999) (per curiam), cerL granted, 120 S. Ct. 2004 (2000).
277. 177 F.3d 1083 (9th Cir. 1999) (per curiam) (denying petition for en banc review),
amending 161 F.3d 1199 (9th Cir. 1998).
278. Adams, 194 F.3d at 1070.
279. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 25 n.2 (1991)
(explaining that the arbitration clause that bound Gilmer was not part of his employment
contract with Interstate/Johnson Lane). If the Supreme Court were to affirm Adams, the
Gilmer decision would survive only because the arbitration clause at issue was part of
Gilmer's application to be registered as a securities representative rather than part of his
employment contract. See id.
280. See, e.g., Craft, 177 F.3d at 1087 n.7 (citing Cole, Incentives and Arbitration, supra
note 5, at 468; Matthew W. Finkin, Employment Contracts Under the FAA-Reconsidered,
48 LAB. L.J. 329,333 (1997); Stempel, supra note 100, at 294; and other sources).
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power was much narrower in 1925 than it is today, only those
employees who actually transported goods or people across state lines
could possibly have been considered to be involved in interstate
commerce in 1925.1 Consequently, the requirement in section 2 of
the FAA that federal courts may only enforce arbitration clauses
contained in contracts "evidencing a transaction involving" 2
interstate commerce meant that transportation workers were the only
possible objects of federal authority over arbitration proceedings.
2 3
Having placed the coverage provisions of section 2 in their proper
historical context, the court reasoned that Congress intended for the
section 1 exclusion to exempt from the FAA every employee who
could conceivably have been reached by section 2.4  The court
therefore concluded that the FAA does not apply to labor or
employment contracts.25
There is much to recommend this reasoning, but the Supreme
Court is unlikely to accept it. As noted above, the weight of circuit
court authority strongly supports a narrow reading of the FAA's
section 1 exclusion.26 More importantly, to affirm Adams would be
to transform the Gilmer decision from a manifesto for employment
arbitration into an oddball decision that would apply only in cases
where the arbitration agreement is not part of an employment
contract.287 However welcome it might be, such a drastic retreat from
the Court's aggressively pro-arbitration FAA jurisprudence cannot be
expected.
Yet, even if the Supreme Court reverses Adams, courts can and
should strengthen their protection of the statutory employment rights
of nonunionized employees by requiring that any waiver of an
individual's statutory right to a judicial forum for her employment
discrimination claims be clear and unmistakable. Furthemore, courts
should only compel the arbitration of statutory discrimination claims
after they have rigorously scrutinized the proposed arbitration
procedures to ensure that arbitration will not result in the loss of
substantive statutory rights.
281. Id at 1086-87.
282. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1994).
283. Craft, 177 F.3d at 1086-87.
284. Id
285. Id at 1086-87, 1094.
286. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
287. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 25 n.2 (1991)
(explaining that the arbitration clause that bound Gilmer was not part of his employment
contract with Interstate/Johnson Lane).
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A. The "Clear and Unmistakable" Standard Should Be Extended to
Arbitration Clauses in Individual Employment Contracts
In Wright, the Supreme Court signaled in dicta that it would
oppose extending the "clear and unmistakable" standard to
arbitration clauses in individual employment contracts.28
Nevertheless, the gap between that standard and the presumption of
arbitrability that courts currently apply to such clauses is troubling.
Suppose, for example, that a contract contains a generic, broadly
worded clause requiring mandatory arbitration of "all disputes arising
under or relating to this agreement" and a pledge that the parties will
follow "federal and state law governing the employment
relationship." If this hypothetical contract is a CBA, the arbitration
clause does not come close to passing the "clear and unmistakable"
standard employed in Brown. But the very same language in an
individual employment contract might well be read to encompass
federal employment discrimination claims under the Mitsubishi
presumption of arbitrability. Understanding why a generic, broadly
worded arbitration clause should be read so differently depending on
the kind of contract in which it appears is not easy, and the potential
for unfairness to nonunionized employees is significant.
Some courts have reacted to this potential unfairness by
imposing heightened notice requirements for individual waivers of
the right to a judicial forum for employment discrimination claims.M9
In Rosenberg v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., for
example, the First Circuit held that individual waivers will not be
enforced unless the employee receives "some minimal level of notice
... that statutory claims are subject to arbitration. ' '290 The court drew
some support for this principle from Wright, though it acknowledged
that its "notice" test is less demanding than the "clear and
unmistakable" standard.291 While the Rosenberg decision is a step in
288. Wright v. Universal Mar. Serv. Corp., 525 U.S. 70, 80-81 (1998) (noting that the
"clear and unmistakable" standard was not applicable in Gilmer because that case
involved only an individual's waiver of his own rights).
289. See Rosenberg v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 70 F.3d 1, 21 (1st
Cir. 1999) (refusing to compel arbitration of Title VII and ADEA claims because the
plaintiff had not received adequate notice that she had agreed to arbitrate those claims);
Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. Lai, 42 F.3d 1299, 1305 (9th Cir. 1994) (refusing to
compel arbitration of a Title VII claim because the plaintiffs had not knowingly agreed to
a waiver of their rights to a judicial forum).
290. Rosenberg, 170 F.3d at 21.
291. See id. at 20-21.
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the right direction, it does not go far enough2 g Despite the Supreme
Court's efforts to distinguish Wright from Gilmer, the reasoning of
the Wright decision strongly supports the extension of the "clear and
unmistakable" standard to individual employment contracts.
As the Supreme Court indicated in Wright, there are three basic
interpretive approaches to the question of whether an arbitration
clause encompasses an employee's statutory discrimination claims.2 93
One might employ a presumption of arbitrability, thus assuming that
the clause includes such claims unless it clearly fails to do so294 At
the opposite end of the spectrum, one might presume that the
arbitration clause does not cover statutory discrimination claims
unless their inclusion is clear and unmistakable. 9 Both these
approaches put a "thumb on the scales" in favor of one result or
another.96 A third approach would simply read the arbitration clause
292. Some commentators have recommended a "knowing and voluntary" standard for
waivers of the right to litigate statutory employment discrimination claims. See, e.g., Lewis
Maltby, Paradise Lost-How the Gilmer Court Lost the Opportunity for Alternative
Dispute Resolution to Improve Civil Rights, 12 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 1, 10 (1994);
Monica J. Washington, Note, Compulsory Arbitration of Statutory Employment Disputes:
Judicial Review Without Judicial Reformation, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 844, 880 (1999); see also
Grodin, supra note 5, at 36-39 (sympathetically discussing the "knowing and voluntary"
standard). Such a standard might seem to promise more protection to employees than the
notice requirements in Rosenberg and Lai, as one could imagine courts routinely using
that standard to refuse to enforce adhesive arbitration agreements on the ground that such
agreements are not fully "voluntary." Such an aggressive use of the "knowing and
voluntary" standard, however, would conflict with the FAA's instruction that arbitration
agreements within its scope should be enforceable "save upon such grounds as exist at law
or in equity for the revocation of any contract." Federal Arbitration Act § 2, 9 U.S.C. § 2
(1994). The language of section 2 indicates that arbitration agreements should be placed
on the same footing as any other contract. See Stephen J. Ware, Arbitration and
Unconscionability After Doctor's Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REv.
1001, 1011-13 (1996) (explaining that under the Supreme Court's "contractual" approach
to arbitration, any state law that allows revocation of an arbitration agreement on grounds
that would not apply to any other contract is preempted by the FAA). Thus, an adhesive
arbitration agreement should only be refused enforcement as "involuntary" under
circumstances in which any other adhesive contract would also be refused enforcement.
Courts heeding the message of section 2 could not use the idea of voluntariness to
invalidate arbitration agreements simply because they are adhesive, as most adhesion
contracts are enforceable under ordinary contract law. Seus v. John Nuveen & Co., 146
F.3d 175, 184 (3d Cir. 1998) ("A contract of adhesion is invalid only where its terms
unreasonably favor the other party." (citing Witmer v. Exxon Corp., 434 A.2d 1222, 1228
(Pa. 1981)); Ware, supra, at 1029 (stating that courts generally enforce contracts of
adhesion as long as their terms are substantively fair).
293. See Wright v. Universal Mar. Serv. Corp., 525 U.S. 70, 77-80 (1998) (discussing
presumptions of arbitrability, ordinary textual analysis, and the "clear and unmistakable"
standard as rules for interpreting arbitration clauses).
294. See id. at 78.
295. See id. at 79-81.
296. Cf. Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of the
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with no thumb on the scales by employing "ordinary textual
analysis."2' Because arbitration is a matter of contract and contracts
are founded on the mutual assent of the parties, the default mode in
interpreting arbitration clauses ought to be ordinary textual
analysis.2 98  Courts should only be allowed to tip the scales of
interpretation toward one outcome or the other if they have good
reasons for doing so. The Note will now demonstrate that although
the Court of the Steelworkers Trilogy had good reasons for applying a
presumption of arbitrability to contractual disputes in the unionized
workplace, those reasons do not support a similar presumption for
statutory claims under the FAA. Indeed, the legislative history and
text of the FAA suggest that courts should usually employ ordinary
textual analysis when interpreting arbitration clauses in commercial
contracts and individual employment contracts. The Note will then
show that the reasons supporting the Court's adoption of the "clear
and unmistakable" standard for union-negotiated waivers of the right
to litigate statutory discrimination claims also support the application
of that standard to waivers by nonunionized employees.
Three reasons support the presumption of arbitrability
articulated in the Steelworkers Trilogy. First of all, the Court's labor
arbitration cases reflect a judgment that arbitration serves the
substantive goals of national labor policy. 99  The arbitration
provisions in a CBA can be seen as consideration for the union's
promise not to strike,3" and so help to secure industrial peace.
United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF
INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 28-29 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997)
(describing the use of presumptions in statutory interpretation as putting a "thumb on the
scales" in favor of one result).
297. Wright, 525 U.S. at 79.
298. See First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944 (1995) (stating that
courts should apply common law contract principles when interpreting agreements to
arbitrate).
299. See Estreicher, Arbitration Without Unions, supra note 107, at 758 (stating that the
Supreme Court's labor arbitration cases reflect a substantive policy of promoting
arbitration that rests either on its role in preserving industrial peace or on its central role
in the collective bargaining process); see also AT&T Techs., Inc. v. Communications
Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 650 (1986) (observing that the presumption of arbitrability
under the LMRA is based on the belief that arbitrators are in a better position to interpret
collective bargaining agreements than courts and the belief that arbitration prevents
industrial strife); United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S.
574, 578 (1960) (observing that commercial arbitration is a "substitute for litigation,"
whereas labor arbitration is "a substitute for industrial strife"); Nelson, supra note 92, at
327 (stating that the presumption of arbitrability in labor law is supported by policies of
"concern for public order and national security").
300. Malin & Ladenson, supra note 3, at 1192 (citing Boys Mkt., Inc. v. Retail Clerks
Union Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 249 (1970)).
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Federal labor policy has also sought to promote industrial self-
governance. Though CBAs are the primary instruments of this self-
governance, they are necessarily incomplete because the parties
cannot anticipate all the issues that might arise in the course of their
working relationship."' Arbitration is an essential supplement to the
collective bargaining process because it functions to put flesh on the
bare bones of the CBA.3° The Court of the Steelworkers Trilogy
announced its presumption of arbitrability precisely because it meant
to favor one mode of dispute resolution over others on policy
grounds.0 3 It made the judgment that, in the collective bargaining
context, public policy demands that as many disputes be settled by
arbitration as possible.
As the Supreme Court indicated in Wright,'°4 the second
rationale supporting the presumption of arbitrability in the
Steelworkers Trilogy is that arbitrators will do a better job
interpreting CBAs than judges because they know more about the
"law of the shop."3 °5 Labor arbitration employs decision-makers with
far more specialized knowledge of the issues than any judge could
possess because unions and employers choose arbitrators who are
familiar with their particular industry.
3 6
Finally, the presumption that union and employer intended to
arbitrate virtually all their disagreements is consistent with the
reasonable expectations of the parties. 7 Because labor arbitration
produces more informed decisions and facilitates industrial harmony,
it is reasonable to assume that the parties would want to arbitrate as
many of their disagreements as possible."'
None of these reasons calls for extending the presumption of
arbitrability in the Steelworkers Trilogy to the FAA.0 9 Whereas the
301. See Warrior & Gulf, 363 U.S. at 578.
302. See id. at 581.
303. Estreicher, Arbitration Without Unions, supra note 107, at 765 (suggesting that the
presumption of arbitrability in labor law is meant "to promote a particular dispute-
resolution mechanism").
304. Wright v. Universal Mar. Serv. Corp., 525 U.S. 70,78 (1998).
305. Warrior & Gulf, 363 U.S. at 582.
306. Id.
307. Estreicher, Arbitration Without Unions, supra note 107, at 757-58.
308. See AT&T Techs., Inc. v. Communications Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 650
(1986) (stating that the presumption of arbitrability "'best accords with the parties'
presumed objectives in pursuing collective bargaining'" (quoting Schneider Moving &
Storage Co. v Rollins, 466 U.S. 364,371-72 (1984)).
309. See Estreicher, Arbitration Without Unions, supra note 107, at 758 (suggesting that
to transport the Steelworkers Trilogy presumption of arbitrability to the FAA would be to
"divorce the Court's doctrine from [its] underlying justification" in national labor policy).
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Steelworkers Trilogy presumption reflects a policy judgment meant to
encourage one form of dispute resolution over another, the FAA is
simply a mechanism for enforcing private agreements when, and only
when, the parties have agreed to arbitrate.10 If the FAA is ultimately
about enforcing private contracts to arbitrate, there is no reason to
read those contracts either broadly or narrowly.31' It is one thing to
say, as the FAA does, that private agreements to arbitrate certain
disputes will be enforced on the same basis as any other private
contract.312 It is another thing, however, to resolve doubts about the
scope of arbitration agreements by reading them to include as much
as possible. That kind of presumption may impose bargains on
private parties to which they did not agree.1 3  Accordingly,
commentators have argued that Mitsubishi and its progeny divorced
the presumption of arbitrability from its policy justification when they
imported that presumption from the collective bargaining context
into the world of commercial arbitration.1 4
To the extent that the presumption of arbitrability under the
LMRA is supported by a belief that arbitrators are in a better
position to interpret collective bargaining agreements than judges,
that rationale is absent when arbitrators are called upon to decide
statutory employment discrimination claims.315 As the Supreme
Court recognized in Wright, there is no reason to use the presumption
of arbitrability to favor arbitration under such circumstances because
310. See Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 219 (1985) (stating that the
FAA "does not mandate the arbitration of all claims, but merely the enforcement ... of
privately negotiated arbitration agreements").
311. See Estreicher, Arbitration Without Unions, supra note 107, at 765-66 (arguing
that the presumption of arbitrability is inconsistent with the FAA).
312. See supra note 93 (explaining that section 2 of the FAA was meant to place
arbitration agreements on the same footing as other contracts).
313. See Nelson, supra note 92, at 326-27 & n.243 (stating that the FAA's presumption
of arbitrability leads courts to compel arbitration of some disputes that would have gone
to court under a more neutral textual analysis).
314. See Estreicher, Arbitration Without Unions, supra note 107, at 765-67 (stating that
"the purpose of the [FAA] should be to enforce the mutual commitments agreed to by the
parties, rather than to promote a particular dispute-resolution mechanism"); Nelson, supra
note 92, at 328 (suggesting that the public policies supporting the presumption of
arbitrability in labor law do not support the extension of that policy to the commercial
context); see also supra notes 92, 101, 120-21 and accompanying text (discussing the
origins of the FAA as a mechanism for enforcing commercial arbitration agreements).
Estreicher also observes that importing a presumption of arbitrability from labor
arbitration seems to conflict with the text of the FAA, which directs courts to compel
arbitration only when they are" 'satisfied that the making of the agreement for arbitration
... is not in issue.' " Estreicher, Arbitration Without Unions, supra note 107, at 765
(quoting 9 U.S.C. § 4 (1994)).
315. See Wright v. Universal Mar. Serv. Corp., 525 U.S. 70,78-79 (1998).
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there is no reason to think that arbitrators are better suited to apply
public, statutory law than federal judges. 6  The same reasoning
suggests that no presumption of arbitrability is warranted where
arbitrators are called upon to interpret federal statutory law in the
nonunion context.
Finally, there is no reason to believe that the parties to an
arbitration agreement enforceable under the FAA would expect their
intentions about the scope of the agreement to be construed
broadly.317  In labor law, arbitration is the primary means of
specifying and refining the terms of the parties' agreement under the
CBA.3 18  Thus, it is natural to believe that at least so long as the
dispute is about the interpretation of the CBA, the parties would
expect it to be arbitrated. In contrast, an arbitration agreement
between an employer and an individual employee is not an
instrument of workplace governance-it simply provides an
alternative means of resolving contract disputes.3 9 The parties have
chosen the language of the arbitration clause to exclude some items
and include others. They should not be presumed to have committed
316. See id. at 78-79; see also Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S.
728, 743 (1981) (observing that the expertise of arbitrators pertains to the "law of the
shop" more than to the "law of the land" (quoting Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415
U.S. 36, 57 (1974)); Cole v. Burns Int'l See. Serv., 105 F.3d 1465, 1477-78 (D.C. Cir. 1997)
(discussing concerns that arbitrators are not competent to decide statutory claims); Feller,
supra note 266, at 70 (stating that labor arbitrators are not chosen for their legal expertise
and that many labor arbitrators are not lawyers). But see James A. King, Jr. et al.,
Agreeing to Disagree on EEO Disputes, 9 LAB. LAW. 97, 102 (1993) (suggesting that
because the parties choose the arbitrator, they should be able to secure one who knows
the relevant law).
317. To be more precise, there is no reason independent of the law for such an
expectation. Of course, if the parties to an arbitration agreement know about the
presumption of arbitrability under the FAA, they will expect courts to broadly construe
their intentions as to the scope of the arbitration agreement, but that can hardly be a
reason for saying that the presumption of arbitrability honors the (previously existing)
reasonable expectations of the parties.
318. See United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf, 363 U.S. 574, 580-81 (1960)
(stating that the arbitration process develops a private common law system for a particular
industry that enables the parties to deal with unanticipated problems). The Court
observed that the arbitration of grievances is "a part of the continuing collective
bargaining process." Id. at 581.
319. See Stead Motors v. Auto. Machinists Lodge No. 1173, 886 F.2d 1200, 1205 (9th
Cir. 1989) (en banc) (stating that labor arbitration differs from commercial arbitration
because a CBA is a mere skeleton to be fleshed out by the private common law developed
through the arbitration of grievances, whereas a commercial contract is meant to be a
"comprehensive distillation of the parties' bargain"). The Stead Motors court observed
that labor arbitration is more than an alternative (and possibly more efficient) way to
resolve disputes. Id; see also Malin and Ladenson, supra note 3, at 1192 (observing that
labor arbitration is not comparable to ordinary contract litigation).
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themselves to arbitrate a greater range of issues than ordinary textual
analysis would indicate.
None of the rationales that support the presumption of
arbitrability in labor law, then, support the extension of that
presumption to individual employment contracts under the FAA.
Indeed, it is very hard to explain why courts should ever put a thumb
on the scales of interpretation without some public policy that would
justify the risk that a court will hold parties to terms on which they
did not agree.32 0  The only such policy that might justify the
presumption of arbitrability under the FAA is a policy of promoting
alternative dispute resolution as a more expeditious way to settle
disputes and thereby reduce federal caseloads. In other words, the
pro-arbitration jurisprudence of the Mitsubishi Trilogy is justified
only if the FAA is read to reflect a congressional policy judgment that
because of clogged dockets and the expense and delay of litigation,
some disputes should be channeled into arbitration even when that
result conflicts with the parties' intentions. Whatever merits such a
policy might have, it is inconsistent with the origins of the FAA as a
means to place private, contractual agreements to arbitrate on the
same footing as other contracts. 321 Admittedly, neither Congress nor
the courts have been blind to arbitration's potential for speeding
dispute resolution and reducing federal caseloads.32 The Supreme
Court, however, has held that the primary purpose of the FAA is to
enforce private agreements to arbitrate, not to promote a particular
mode of dispute resolution in the service of public policy.
3u3
320. Language in some Supreme Court decisions illustrates the inherent tensions
between the presumption of arbitrability and the proposition that arbitration is a matter of
contract. Compare First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 943 (1995)
(stating that arbitration is "a way to resolve those disputes-but only those disputes-that
the parties have agreed to submit to arbitration"), with Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler
Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 626 (1985) (stating that "as with any other contract,
the parties' intentions control, but those intentions are generously construed as to issues of
arbitrability").
321. See supra notes 92, 101, 120-21 and accompanying text (discussing the legislative
history of the FAA).
322. The House Report on the FAA noted that making arbitration agreements
enforceable would respond to "agitation about the costliness and delays of litigation."
H.R. REP. No. 68-96, at 2 (1924) (Sup. Docs. No. Y 1.1/2:8226). One Second Circuit
decision was especially frank in acknowledging the beneficial effects of the FAA on the
federal docket. Robert Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics, Inc., 271 F.2d 402, 410 (2d
Cir. 1959) (stating that "any doubts as to construction of the [FAA] ought to be resolved
in line with its liberal policy of promoting arbitration both to accord with the original
intention of the parties and to help ease the current congestion of court calendars").
323. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 220 (1985) (stating that the
FAA should be interpreted to promote its principal objective of enforcing private
agreements and that the "fortuitous impact of the [FAA] on efficient dispute resolution"
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Consequently, courts should not use the presumption of arbitrability
as a means to reduce federal caseloads at the expense of holding
parties to bargains to which they did not agree. At the very least,
then, the meaning of arbitration clauses in individual employment
contracts should be a matter for "ordinary textual analysis.""3 4 The
remaining question is whether there might be some reason for placing
a thumb on the scales against reading an arbitration clause to
encompass statutory discrimination claims.
In Wright, the Supreme Court found such a reason and held that
any union-negotiated waiver of the right to litigate statutory
discrimination claims must be clear and unmistakable.3"
Nevertheless, the Court also stated that the "clear and unmistakable"
standard did not apply to individual employment contracts and
suggested that this asymmetry was justified by the difference between
CBAs and individual employment contracts.326
To decide whether the "clear and unmistakable" standard should
be extended to the nonunion context, one must first understand the
rationale for applying that standard in the union context. One
possible rationale might be that the "clear and unmistakable"
standard guards against the possibility that union leaders327 will agree
should not be allowed to obscure that principal objective).
324. Wright v. Universal Mar. Serv. Corp., 525 U.S. 70,79 (1998).
325. Id. at 80.
326. Id. at 80-81. At least one lower court has explicitly advanced this explanation for
why the "clear and unmistakable" standard does not apply to individual employment
contracts. Interstate Brands Corp. v. Bakery Drivers & Bakery Goods Vending Machs.
Local Union No. 550, 167 F.3d 764, 767 (2d Cir. 1999) (stating that the "clear and
unmistakable" standard applies only where a person's rights are waived by some other
person or entity). It is noteworthy, however, that Metropolitan Edison did not invoke
problems with unions waiving individual rights in its justification for adopting the "clear
and unmistakable" standard. Instead, the Court merely stated that it would not infer
waiver of a statutory right from a general contract provision. Metro. Edison Co. v. NLRB,
460 U.S. 693, 708 (1983). In other words, its rationale for requiring a clear and
unmistakable union waiver appealed to the importance of the statutory right more than to
any perceived difficulties in a union waiving the individual rights of its members. Further
support for this reading can be found in the Metropolitan Edison Court's reliance on
Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270 (1956). In Mastro Plastics, the Court refused
to hold that a general no-strike provision in a CBA waived the right to strike in opposition
to the employer's unfair labor practice. Id. at 284. Although the right to strike against an
unfair labor practice is conferred on union members collectively in order to facilitate the
collective bargaining process, the Mastro Plastics Court nonetheless stated that such a
waiver would require a "more compelling expression" than a general no-strike clause. Id.
at 283. It appears, then, that the Court's earlier decisions requiring explicit union waivers
did not rest on the fact that a union might be waiving the rights of individual employees.
327. Union members have no statutory right to vote on and ratify CBAs, though such a
right is part of some union constitutions. Alan Hyde, Democracy in Collective Bargaining,
93 YALE L.J. 793, 805-06 (1984).
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to a waiver that harms the interests of a minority of the workers they
represent.32 Yet, if the union leadership set out to oppress a minority
by approving a CBA that unfairly sacrifices minority interests, having
clear and unmistakable evidence of what is happening would be of
little help to the minority. Only the duty of fair representation could
protect against such an abuse of power. 19 In other words, the
potential for majority oppression might be a reason not to enforece
union-negotiated waivers, but it is not a reason to require that such
waivers be clear and unmistakable. A better account of the rationale
for requiring that union-negotiated waivers of the right to litigate
statutory discrimination claims be clear and unmistakable would
emphasize the importance of the right at issue, the expectations of
union negotiators in agreeing to a broadly worded arbitration clause,
and the need to make the terms of the agreement clear to parties who
were not privy to its negotiation.
The Court's initial explanation for adopting the "clear and
unmistakable" standard in Wright pointed to the importance of the
right to litigate statutory discrimination claims.33 °  The right to a
judicial forum is so important because the substantive rights
3 31
guaranteed by employment discrimination statutes are hollow
without a neutral, procedurally adequate forum in which those rights
can be vindicated. 32 While acknowledging that the loss of a judicial
forum need not compromise substantive rights, the Court stated that
"Gardner-Denver at least stands for the proposition that the right to a
federal judicial forum is of sufficient importance to be protected
against less-than-explicit union waiver in a CBA. 333 .Significantly, the
Court has required that waivers of statutory rights be clear and
unmistakable solely on the basis of this rationale, even in cases where
the statutory rights at issue were collective rather than individual.3 3
328. See Mayer G. Freed et al., Unions, Fairness, and the Conundrums of Collective
Choice, 56 S. CAL. L. REv. 461, 466 (1983) (stating that unions have the power to make
bargains with management that harm the interests of particular employees).
329. A union that set out to sacrifice the interests of minority members would be liable
to those members for breach of the duty of fair representation. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S.
171, 177 (1967) (stating that the duty of fair representation extends to the union's
negotiation of collective bargaining agreements).
330. Wright, 525 U.S. at 80.
331. Such substantive rights include, e.g., the right to be free from discrimination, the
right to receive reasonable accommodation for disabilities, etc.
332. See Cole v. Burns Int'l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1482 (D.C. Cir. 1997) ("At a
minimum, statutory rights include both a substantive protection and access to a neutral
forum in which to enforce those protections.").
333. Wright, 525 U.S. at 80.
334. See supra note 326 (discussing Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270
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A second reason supporting the "clear and unmistakable"
standard is the expectations of union negotiators. Unions are
authorized to deal primarily with rights that are conferred on union
members collectively in order to advance collective interests. In
contrast, the right of an individual employee to be free of
discrimination is conferred individually and is not intended to be part
of the collective bargaining process. 336 Furthermore, existing judicial
doctrine would lead union negotiators to believe that they have no
authority to bargain away an individual's statutory right to a judicial
forum for her statutory discrimination claims.337 Finally, because the
very purpose of a collective bargaining system is to establish the
rights of the union and the employer by private agreement, it would
be natural for the union to believe that any agreement to arbitrate
"all disputes arising or relating to the agreement" concerned only
those employee rights that were created by the collective bargaining
process. 338 For all these reasons, union negotiators probably would
not expect that a "broad but nonspecific" 3 9 arbitration clause would
waive the individual statutory rights of employees to a judicial forum
for their employment discrimination claims.
The argument from reasonable expectations is consistent with
the Supreme Court's reasons for applying the "clear and
unmistakable" standard to other terms of arbitration agreements. In
First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan,"0 the Court held that if the
parties wish the arbitrator to be able to decide the scope of his own
authority, they must state that intention clearly and unmistakably."4'
(1956)).
335. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 51 (1974) (stating that unions
may exercise or relinquish those rights that are conferred on employees collectively in
order to foster the collective bargaining process).
336. 1d
337. See Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int'l v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 199 F.3d 477,484 (D.C.
Cir. 1999) ("Thus, even after Gilmer, Gardner-Denver stands as a firewall between
individual statutory rights the Congress intended can be bargained away by the union ...
and those that remain exclusively within the individual's control." (citation omitted)),
vacated and reh'g granted, No. 98-7196, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 3756 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 9,
2000), reinstated en banc, 211 F.3d 1312 (D.C. Cir. 2000), petition for cert. filed, 69
U.S.L.W. 3157 (U.S. Aug. 16, 2000) (No. 00-260); see also supra note 204 and
accompanying text (observing that all circuits save the Fourth have continued to follow
Gardner-Denver even in the wake of the Gilmer decision).
338. See Malin & Ladenson, supra note 3, at 1190-95 (characterizing labor arbitration
as a process of specifying the content of the general contractual commitments embodied in
the CBA).
339. Carson v. Giant Food, Inc., 175 F.3d 325,332 (4th Cir. 1999).
340. 514 U.S. 938 (1995).
341. Id. at 944.
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The Court observed that the question of who should decide the scope
of the arbitrator's power is sufficiently "arcane" that the parties might
have failed to attend to it in their negotiations. 342 It therefore
reasoned that the "clear and unmistakable" standard should apply to
that question because of the basic principle that parties should be
forced to arbitrate only those matters that they have specifically
agreed to arbitrate.343 In other words, the Supreme Court adopted
the "clear and unmistakable" standard as a way to safeguard the
legitimate expectations of the parties.3 4 Because the law establishes
that generally the question of arbitrability is for the judge, not the
arbitrator,345 the parties would have expected that result when they
agreed to a broadly worded clause requiring the arbitration of all
contractual disputes.346
A final reason supporting the "clear and unmistakable" standard
is that it helps to insure that all union members understand the
consequences of approving the CBA for their statutory rights as
individuals. 47 Such a requirement is appropriate because union
members are not privy to the negotiation of the CBA, and are thus
less likely than their representatives to grasp its full implications? 48 In
other words, requiring a clear waiver of litigation rights is a
recognition of the fact that most union members will be bound by an
agreement they had little chance to influence aside from either
accepting or rejecting proposals at the completion of negotiations.
These three reasons are mutually supporting. Taken together,
they suggest that if courts read broadly worded arbitration clauses to
encompass statutory discrimination claims, important employee rights
might be waived without the awareness of either union negotiators or
individual employees. To apply the "clear and unmistakable"
342. See id. at 945.
343. Id.
344. See id (stating that to interpret "silence or ambiguity" as giving arbitrators the
power to decide questions of arbitrability "might too often force unwilling parties to
arbitrate a matter they reasonably would have thought a judge, not an arbitrator, would
decide").
345. AT&T Techs., Inc. v. Communications Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643,649 (1986).
346. See Kaplan, 514 U.S. at 945.
347. While unions are not required to submit CBAs to their membership for
ratification, many unions do so. See Hyde, supra note 327, at 805 (stating that roughly
sixty percent of unionized employees have no right to ratify their CBA under their unions'
constitutions and thereby implying that roughly forty percent of unionized employees do
have such a right). Consequently, it is important for rank and file union members to
understand the possible impact of voting for a CBA on their statutory employment rights.
348. See id. at 793-95 (emphasizing the rank and file union members' lack of influence
on the negotiation and ratification of CBAs).
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standard to CBA arbitration clauses is simply to recognize that even
if unions have the authority to bargain away the statutory rights of
individuals, they should at least be aware of what they are doing so
that they can extract concessions from the management in return.' 9
The same rationales that support the "clear and unmistakable"
standard in the collective bargaining context also support the
extension of that standard to individual employment contracts. The
right to a judicial forum is just as important to individual employees
as to their unionized counterparts, therefore that right should also be
protected against inadvertent waiver in nonunion contexts.350
Similarly, the typical employee has no more input into the negotiation
of the agreements by which she will be bound than the rank and file
union member. 1  Most individual employment contracts are
presented on a "take it or leave it" basis with no opportunity for
negotiation over most contractual terms 2.35  As a result, individual
employees are in a poor position to appreciate that their agreement
to a broadly worded arbitration clause may include the waiver of
important statutory rights.
353
Whether the "clear and unmistakable" standard is necessary to
protect the reasonable expectations of individual employees is a
closer question. As noted above, union negotiators typically see
themselves as exercising a limited agency on behalf of individual
employees-they generally do not see the right to a judicial forum for
statutory discrimination claim as theirs to give away. 54 In contrast, it
might be argued that when an individual employee signs an extremely
broad clause like the one in Waffle House agreeing to arbitrate" 'any
dispute or claim concerning Applicant's employment,' " the
349. Cf. Metro. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 460 U.S. 693, 707 (1983) (observing that unions
have considerable discretion to bargain away the rights of individual employees in order to
secure gains that will benefit employees as a whole).
350. Cf. Wright v. Universal Mar. Serv. Corp., 525 U.S. 70, 80 (1998) (commenting on
the importance of the right to a judicial forum for employment discrimination claims).
351. See Stone, supra note 18, at 1036-37 (emphasizing that most arbitration
agreements signed by individual employees are adhesion contracts).
352. Id
353. See Alfred W. Blumrosen, Exploring Voluntary Arbitration of Individual
Employment Disputes, 16 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 249, 254-55 (1983) (suggesting that in
the nonunion context, employers may unilaterally draft arbitration clauses in ways that
disadvantage employees).
354. See supra notes 335-39 and accompanying text (discussing the expectations of
union negotiators); see also Turner, supra note 5, at 198-200 (arguing that because of their
limited agency, unions simply lack the power to bargain away an individual employee's
right to a judicial forum for her employment discrimination claims).
355. EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 193 F.3d 805, 807 (4th Cir. 1999) (quoting the
employment application), petition for cert. filed, 68 U.S.L.W. 3726 (U.S. Oct. 2, 2000) (No.
2000]
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employee should expect agreement to such a clause to encompass all
employment related disputes.
While such an argument has some force, differences in the
negotiating posture of unions and individual employees suggest that
allowing individual employees to waive their statutory rights via a
highly general arbitration clause carries a risk of unfair surprise that
warrants the protection of the "clear and unmistakable" standard. To
use the jargon of game theory, unions are repeat players whereas
employees are typically one-shot players in the arbitration game. 6
Unions and employers will face each other again and again in the
arbitration of disputes under a collective bargaining agreement 7.35  As
a result, both parties have ample incentives to scrutinize closely the
proposed method of dispute resolution under their agreement.
While such scrutiny requires the union to incur substantial
information gathering costs, those costs are well justified by the fact
that any ill-advised choices will come back to haunt the union again
and again.35 9 In contrast, the typical employee is a one-shot player. 60
When signing an employment contract, she may expect that no
dispute will ever arise between herself and her employer 6.3 1  As a
result, the typical employee will rationally conclude that it is simply
not worth the required information costs to closely scrutinize an
employment agreement in order to determine its exact effects on her
statutory rights.3 62 The employee will simply make the assumption
that people commonly make when signing form contracts; she will
assume that she is bound by all the unread terms that are not
unreasonable.363 In a judicial climate where mandatory arbitration is
99-1823).
356. Cole, A Funny Thing, supra note 17, at 619-29 (using game theory to contrast the
bargaining postures of unions and individual employees).
357. ld. at 625.
358. Id. at 626.
359. Id. (observing that despite the costs involved, rational union negotiators will
carefully analyze every provision of a proposed arbitration agreement).
360. Id- at 619-24 (discussing the status of individual employees as one-shot players in
the arbitration game).
361. Id. at 620 (discussing the judgmental bias of employees that leads them to "ignore
or de-emphasize" the risk that they will one day engage in litigation with their employer)
(citing Paul Slovic et al., Facts Versus Fears: Understanding Perceived Risk, in JUDGMENT
UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 462 (David Kahneman et al. eds.,
1982) (discussing judgmental bias that leads people to underestimate the risk that a low
probability event will take place)); cf. Grodin, supra note 5, at 29 (criticizing predispute
arbitration agreements on the ground that employees cannot properly assess the probable
effect of the agreement on their statutory rights before a dispute arises).
362. Cole, A Funny Thing, supra note 17, at 620-21.
363. See Ware, supra note 178, at 118-19. Ware cites the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
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not viewed as inherently unreasonable, 364 employees who sign
standardized employment agreements may waive important statutory
rights without any awareness of what they are doing. Because the
right to litigate statutory discrimination claims is admittedly
important,365 it at least deserves protection against the rational refusal
of one-shot players to clarify the terms of arbitration clauses in form
contracts.3 6
To sum up, the same reasons that justify the Supreme Court's
embrace of the "clear and unmistakable" standard in the collective
bargaining context support the extension of that standard to
individual employment contracts. Federal courts should ignore the
Supreme Court's dicta in Wright and protect both unionized and
nonunionized employees from inadvertent waivers by requiring that
any waiver of the right to litigate statutory discrimination claims be
clear and unmistakable.
3 67
The "clear and unmistakable" standard would have been enough
to protect the plaintiff in Waffle House. Yet it still does not protect
the statutory rights of individual employees as well as it protects the
rights of their unionized counterparts. The reason for this disparity is
the difference between the relative bargaining power of unionized
and nonunionized employees.
As noted above, the "clear and unmistakable" standard does a
good job of protecting unionized employees because their
representatives have substantial bargaining power.368 Even in those
CONTRACrs, which provides that when signing a standardized agreement, parties are not
bound by "unknown terms which are beyond the range of reasonable expectation."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACrS § 211 cmt. f (1981).
364. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 626-
27 (1985) (remarking that judicial suspicion of arbitration is no longer appropriate).
365. Wright v. Universal Mar. Serv. Corp., 525 U.S. 70,80 (1998).
366. See Stewart E. Sterk, Enforceability of Agreements to Arbitrate: An Examination
of the Public Policy Defense, 2 CARDOZO L. REV. 481, 486-87 (1981) (arguing that
arbitration agreements should not be enforced where "unequal transaction costs.., make
it likely that one party will draft an agreement that the other will sign without first
questioning or reviewing the agreement's arbitration clause"); cf. First Options of
Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 945 (1995) (holding that an intent to have an
arbitrator decide the scope of her own authority must be clearly and unmistakably stated
partly on the ground that the parties to a contract would often fail to focus their attention
on that question).
367. See Estriecher, Predispute Agreements, supra note 4, at 1358 (voicing support for a
rule requiring that arbitration clauses clearly indicate that they include statutory
employment claims); Robert A. Gorman, The Gilmer Decision and the Private Arbitration
of Public-Law Disputes, 1995 U. ILL. L. REV. 635, 652 (1995) (suggesting that the "clear
and unmistakable" standard should be applied to individual employee waivers of the right
to a judicial forum).
368. See supra notes 240-52 and accompanying text.
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rare instances when a union clearly and unmistakably waives the right
to a judicial forum, union bargaining power should be sufficient to
insure that the arbitration procedures are neutral and fair. 69
Nonunionized employees usually come to the bargaining table on far
less equal terms, and the employer may try to use its superior position
to unilaterally shape the arbitration procedures to its advantage.3 10
Examples of employer overreaching in setting the procedural rules
for binding arbitration are common in the case law,371 and judicial
acquiescence in such overreaching is disturbingly frequent.
37 2
Individual employees may sometimes have little choice but to accept
arbitration clauses that are both completely explicit and terribly
unfair.373  Even assuming that the parties have clearly and
unmistakably agreed to arbitrate statutory discrimination claims, the
question remains whether such agreements should be enforced.
369. See Cole, A Funny Thing, supra note 17, at 618, 628 (arguing that union-
negotiated waivers of the right to a judicial forum should be enforced because the fact that
both union and management are "repeat players" with relatively equal bargaining power
will insure that the arbitral forum is neutral and fair).
370. See Bingham, supra note 21, at 226-27; Blumrosen, supra note 353, at 254-55.
371. E.g., Hooters of Am., Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933, 938-40 (4th Cir. 1999). In
Hooters, the company established arbitration procedures that were "so one-sided that
their only possible purpose [was] to undermine the neutrality of the proceeding." Id. at
938. Among other offenses, the Hooters rules gave the company unrestricted control over
the selection of the arbitrator. Id. at 938-39. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district
court's denial of Hooters's motion to compel arbitration, holding that the arbitration
agreement with the plaintiff should be rescinded because Hooters had breached that
agreement by creating "a sham system unworthy even of the name of arbitration." Id. at
940-41; see also Stirlen v. Supercuts, Inc., 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d 138, 148-52 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997)
(holding that an arbitration clause that favored the employer by limiting employee
remedies and exempting some employer claims from mandatory arbitration was
unconscionable).
372. See, e.g., DeGaetano v. Smith Barney, Inc., No. 95 CIV. 1613 (DLC), 1996 WL
44226, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (compelling arbitration of Title VII claims under an
agreement that barred arbitrator from granting injunctive relief, attorneys' fees, or
punitive damages); Pony Express Courier Corp. v. Morris, 921 S.W.2d 817, 822 (Tex. App.
1996) (holding that the trial court abused its discretion in declaring unconscionable an
arbitration agreement that severely limited the employee's remedies and gave her no right
to discovery).
373. Because an arbitration agreement may be revoked on general contract grounds,
see 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1994), the contract doctrine of unconscionability places some limits on
how far employers can overreach without rendering their arbitration clauses
unenforceable. See generally Ware, supra note 292 (discussing the application of the
unconscionability doctrine to arbitration cases).
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B. Public Policy Requires Courts to Rigorously Scrutinize
Arbitration Agreements for Procedural Fairness
The Supreme Court has stated that even if the parties have
agreed to arbitrate a dispute, courts must still ask whether some
public policy external to the agreement precludes enforcement. 74
Before the 1980s, policy considerations were the chief reason why the
Court refused to enforce agreements to arbitrate federal statutory
claims? 75 The Mitsubishi Trilogy, however, served to sharply limit the
role of public policy considerations in determining the enforceability
of agreements to arbitrate statutory claims.376 Finding that the FAA
evinced Congress's intention to promote arbitration, the Court
reasoned that statutory claims are arbitrable unless Congress has
explicitly declared that they are not. 77
374. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628
(1985).
375. See, e.g., Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 48-49 (1974) (holding
that a prior arbitral determination of the plaintiff's race discrimination claim did not bar a
subsequent lawsuit on the ground that Title VII had given federal courts the primary role
in combatting employment discrimination); Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 435-37 (1953)
(holding that the public policies embodied in securities legislation precluded enforcement
of a predispute agreement to arbitrate claims of securities fraud).
376. Moohr, supra note 2, at 415.
377. Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 628 (stating that the FAA's liberal federal policy favoring
arbitration can be trumped only if Congress's desire to preclude arbitration can be found
in either the text or legislative history of the relevant statute). The Court has also stated
that a congressional intent to preclude arbitration might be discerned from "an inherent
conflict between arbitration and the statute's underlying purposes." Shearson/American
Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 227 (1987). One might imagine this language
forming the basis for powerful public policy arguments that employment discrimination
claims should never be submitted to arbitration. After all, the purpose of Title VII and
related statutes is not merely to compensate the victims of discrimination; the statutes are
also designed to "eliminat[e] . . . discrimination in the workplace." McKennon v.
Nashville Banner Publ'g Co., 513 U.S. 352, 358 (1995) (quoting Oscar Mayer & Co. v.
Evans, 441 U.S. 750, 756 (1979)). Judicial resolution of employment discrimination claims
serves such public policy goals as deterring discriminatory conduct, developing the body of
discrimination law, and forming public values. Moohr, supra note 2, at 427-39. Because
settling employment discrimination claims in private arbitration is arguably incompatible
with these goals, see id, one could argue that allowing mandatory arbitration of
employment discrimination claims is inconsistent with the inherent purposes of Title VII
and related statutes. This line of argument, however, has never been taken seriously by
the Supreme Court. See, e.g., Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 27-28
(1991) (rejecting the public policy argument against the arbitration of an ADEA claim
because the Court had already upheld arbitration of claims under other federal statutes
that also advanced important public policies); Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 637 ("[S]o long as the
prospective litigant effectively may vindicate its statutory cause of action in the arbitral
forum, the statute will continue to serve both its remedial and deterrent function.");
Moohr, supra note 2, at 413 (stating that the Mitsubishi Trilogy changed the focus of the
Court's FAA arbitration jurisprudence from public policy to the fairness of the arbitral
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The Mitsubishi Trilogy's view that a statutory claim is arbitrable
unless the statute contains an "implied repeal"378 of the FAA is open
to serious criticisms. First, it is wildly ahistorical to read the FAA as
expressing a strong preference for the arbitration of statutory
disputes that can only be overcome by an implied repeal.379 The
drafters of the FAA did not contemplate its application to statutory
claims;380 instead, it was intended to facilitate the enforcement of
private agreements to arbitrate contractual disputes between
commercial parties.38' Second, the implied repeal theory makes it
practically impossible to deny enforcement of an arbitration clause on
public policy grounds. Because Title VII and other anti-
discrimination statutes were passed at a time when no one thought
the FAA authorized the federal courts to compel the arbitration of
federal statutory claims, those statutes are unsurprisingly devoid of
any evidence that the enacting Congresses intended to implicitly
repeal the FAA.3"
Despite the force of these criticisms, however, the Mitsubishi
Trilogy continues to undermine efforts to argue that public policy
forum).
378. Estreicher, Arbitration Without Unions, supra note 107, at 785-86 (stating that the
Supreme Court's post-Mitsubishi position is that the FAA's pro-arbitration policies apply
to statutory claims unless the statute effects an express or implied repeal of the FAA).
379. Significantly, it took sixty years for the Supreme Court to discover (in the
Mitsubishi Trilogy) that Congress intended the FAA's pro-arbitration policies to extend to
the arbitration of statutory claims. Certainly, the Wilko Court discerned no such
intention. See Wilko, 346 U.S. at 434-37 (refusing to compel arbitration of a claim for
securities fraud). The Court's interpretation in Mitsubishi, then, sharply conflicts with the
principle that contemporaneous interpretations of statutes should be privileged. EARL T.
CRAWFORD, THE CONSTRUCrON OF STATUTES 388-89 (1940) (stating that
contemporaneous construction of a statute is not controlling but should ordinarily be
accorded great weight).
380. See Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 646 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that neither the
text nor the legislative history of the FAA indicate that Congress contemplated its use to
compel the arbitration of statutory claims); see also Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 42 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) ("I doubt that any legislator who voted for [the FAA in 1925] expected it to
apply to statutory claims .... ).
381. See supra notes 92, 101, 120-21 and accompanying text (discussing the original
purpose of the FAA).
382. Estreicher, Arbitration Without Unions, supra note 107, at 789. Mitsubishi's
presumption that public policy does not preclude the enforcement of agreements to
arbitrate statutory claims arguably received some support in the Civil Rights Act of 1991.
One might argue that although Congress had an opportunity in enacting that legislation to
signal its disapproval of the trend toward arbitration of statutory claims, it instead
included an endorsement of arbitration procedures within the Act. See Civil Rights Act of
1991, § 118 (codified as 42 U.S.C. § 1981 note (1994)) (encouraging use of alternative
dispute resolution methods "[w]here appropriate and to the extent authorized by law");
see also supra notes 201-02, 222-23 and accompanying text (discussing the Civil Rights
Act of 1991).
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categorically precludes the arbitration of federal employment
discrimination claims. A different type of public policy argument
acknowledges that agreements to arbitrate employment
discrimination claims can sometimes be consistent with public policy.
It suggests, however, that such agreements should be enforced only if
the proposed arbitration procedures comply with due process
norms.383 According to this approach, exacting judicial scrutiny of
arbitration procedures can prevent the loss of substantive individual
rights3 4 while increasing the level of employee access to a satisfactory
means of dispute resolution. 85
This public policy argument begins from very general
observations about the policies served by federal employment
discrimination statutes. As was described earlier, statutory
employment rights reflect a congressional judgment that individuals
should enjoy certain rights in relative freedom from the vagaries of
market power. These ights are taken "off the table," so to speak;
they form a baseline from which individual employees can bargain
with employers for contractual rights in addition to those guaranteed
by statute. When statutory employment rights are seen in this light,
the prospect of employers presenting employees with form contracts
mandating the arbitration of statutory discrimination claims as a
condition of employment is disturbing. It suggests that the very rights
Congress had sought to remove from the bargaining table can still be
compromised by superior bargaining power. If statutory rights are
being compromised when employees waive their right to a judicial
383. See, e.g., Cole v. Burns Int'l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1479-88 (D.C. Cir. 1997)
(upholding arbitration agreement after reviewing the agreement for procedural
adequacy); Estreicher, Predispute Agreements, supra note 4, at 1349 (stating that public
policy requires adherence to "certain adjudicative quality standards" in the arbitration of
federal statutory claims); Gorman, supra note 367, at 644-45 (arguing that courts must
scrutinize the contemplated arbitration system for procedural adequacy before compelling
arbitration or confirming arbitral awards).
384. Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 628 (stating that parties do not forego substantive rights
when they agree to arbitrate statutory claims).
385. See Estreicher, Predispute Agreements, supra note 4, at 1349-52, 1375 (arguing
that the law should encourage arbitrations of statutory employment claims so long as
those arbitrations satisfy standards of procedural adequacy); Theodore J. St. Antoine,
Mandatory Arbitration of Employee Discrimination Claims: Unmitigated Evil or Blessing
in Disguise?, 15 T.M. COOLEY L. REv. 1, 2 (1998) (suggesting that most employees might
be better off with mandatory arbitration so long as the arbitral system has due process
guarantees). Professor St. Antoine suggests that mandatory arbitration may be the only
realistic hope that lower salaried workers have for a forum in which to vindicate their
statutory rights because few lawyers would find it worthwhile to press their claims in court.
St. Antoine, supra, at 7-8.
386. See supra note 263 and accompanying text.
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forum, judicial enforcement of arbitration agreements undermines
the public policies of employment discrimination law at the most
fundamental level.3" Consequently, arbitration agreements that
compromise statutory rights should not be enforced.3" The public
policies animating employment discrimination law require courts to
scrutinize the proposed arbitral forum for procedural adequacy
before deciding to compel arbitration or confirm arbitration
awards.389
This conclusion should not be surprising, as the Supreme Court's
pro-arbitration FAA jurisprudence has been premised on the
assumption that statutory rights are not compromised by the shift to
an arbitral forum. Despite the Court's recognition that the forum in
which a right will be vindicated affects the scope of that right,
390 it
stated in Mitsubishi that arbitration merely provides an alternative
forum for dispute resolution without compromising substantive
statutory rights.39' Similarly, the Gilmer Court's review of the
arbitration procedures to be employed under the NYSE's rules
392
implies a belief that mandatory arbitration agreements should be
enforced only if the contemplated procedures cohere with some
private analogue of due process.393 The Supreme Court's reasoning in
Mitsubishi and Gilmer suggests that the proper question for courts to
consider in deciding whether to enforce agreements to arbitrate
statutory claims is whether the shift to a private forum compromises
substantive rights.394
387. See Cole, 105 F.3d at 1482 (stating that to enforce an arbitration agreement "no
matter what rights it waives or what burdens it imposes ... would be fundamentally at
odds" with public laws such as Title VII and the ADEA).
388. See id. at 1488 (warning that courts "will have no choice but to intercede" if
arbitrators do not vigilantly protect statutory employment rights).
389. See Gorman, supra note 367, at 645.
390. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 56 (1974) (citing U.S. Bulk
Carriers v. Arguelles, 400 U.S. 351,359-60 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring)).
391. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628
(1985) ("By agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forgo the substantive
rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather than
a judicial, forum.").
392. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane, 500 U.S. 20,31-32 (1991).
393. See Cole, 105 F.3d at 1481-83 (upholding an arbitration agreement partly on the
ground that the proposed system of arbitration satisfied the criteria of procedural
adequacy employed by the Gilmer Court); Gorman, supra note 367, at 644-45 ("Arbitral
systems without the procedural safeguards found in the regulations of the New York Stock
Exchange would apparently so undermine the enforcement of statutory claims as to be, in
the [Gilmer] Court's view, intolerable.").
394. Cf. Rosenberg v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 170 F.3d 1, 8 n.4 (1st Cir.
1999) (suggesting that most criticism of arbitration is directed at the procedural
shortcomings of particular arbitration programs rather than at the inherent faults of
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Although the Supreme Court has framed the proper question, it
has not indicated how much process is needed to insure that
arbitration does not compromise substantive rights. The District of
Columbia Circuit has provided a helpful starting point by stating that
"[a]t a minimum, statutory rights include both a substantive
protection and access to a neutral forum in which to enforce those
protections. ' 95 Obviously, a neutral arbitral forum need not offer the
full gamut of procedural protections that the parties would enjoy in
federal court.396 Sacrificing procedural protections may increase the
risk of erroneous decisions, but a modest increase in that risk does
not compromise substantive rights so long as the risk is equitably
distributed 9.3  The touchstone of arbitral fairness is whether the
procedures used tend to skew results in favor of one party. 8
Arbitration procedures that systematically favor the employer over
the employee are not neutral and therefore compromise the
substantive rights of employees.
Much of the scholarly distrust of mandatory agreements to
arbitrate statutory employment disputes no doubt stems from a
perception that arbitration procedures typically do favor employers
over employees,3 99 and some empirical research suggests that the
perception has a factual basis.4°  In particular, repeat player
arbitration per se).
395. Cole, 105 F.3d at 1482 (citing Graham Oil Co. v. ARCO Products Co., 43 F.3d
1244, 1246-48 (9th Cir. 1994)).
396. See Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 628 (stating that parties agreeing to arbitrate their
disputes "traden the procedures and opportunity for review of the courtroom for the
simplicity, informality, and expedition of arbitration").
397. Cf. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) (explaining that courts should
decide how much process the Constitution requires by balancing the government's interest
in efficiency, the private interest threatened by government action, the risk of an
"erroneous deprivation" of that private interest, and the probable value of addditional
procedural safeguards).
398. Bingham explains that the fairness of the arbitral forum may be compromised by
the partiality of the arbitrator or by "structural bias" created when procedural rules favor
one party over another. See Bingham, supra note 21, at 245. An example of structural
bias would be severe limits on discovery, which would systematically disadvantage the
plaintiffs in employment arbitration. See Bales, supra note 242, at 755-56 (noting that
generous discovery is crucial to employment discrimination plaintiffs because they need
access to the employer's personnel files in order to prove their cases).
399. See, e.g., Christine Godsil Cooper, Where Are We Going with Gilmer?: Some
Ruminations on the Arbitration of Discrimination Claims, 11 ST. LouIs U. PUB. L. REv.
203, 240 (1992) (suggesting that employers favor arbitration because they want to
unilaterally shape the arbitral system whereas employees and their lawyers generally
oppose arbitration because they fear that the arbitral forum will be biased); Stone, supra
note 18, at 1040 (stating that mandatory arbitration agreements have a "systematic pro-
employer effect" on outcomes).
400. See Stone, supra note 18, at 1040 n.162 (noting a survey finding that employers are
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employers have been found to do much better than one-shot player
employers in arbitration against one-shot player employees.
40 1
Though there is room for debate about the sources of this "repeat
player effect,"4" two common explanations are that the experience of
repeat players gives them an information advantage over employees
in the selection of arbitrators 40 3 and that arbitrators looking for future
business tend to favor the interests of the repeat player employer.4 4
These explanations suggest that any neutral arbitration system must
have procedures designed to negate these employer advantages so as
to secure a truly impartial arbitrator.
Groups involved in dispute resolution 40 5 government agencies,4°6
and scholars4° have all developed procedural guidelines to govern the
more likely to win in arbitration than in jury trials and that employees who manage to win
in arbitration tend to receive smaller awards than employees who prevail in jury trials)
(citing Stuart Bompey & Michael Pappas, Compulsory Arbitration in Employment
Discrimination Claims: The Impact of Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., in See. on
Emp. & Lab. Law, A.B.A., EEO Comm. Papers (1993)). See generally Bingham, supra
note 21, at 232-39 (reviewing empirical research on arbitration outcomes).
401. Bingham, supra note 21, at 234 (citing Lisa B. Bingham, Employment Arbitration:
The Repeat Player Effect, 1 EMPLOYEE RTS. & EMP. POLY J. 189, 205-13 (1997)).
Bingham's study found that employees arbitrating claims against one-shot player
employers win over seventy percent of the time, while employees arbitrating claims
against repeat player employers win only about sixteen percent of the time. Id.
402. See id. at 239-44 (surveying various theoretical explanations for the repeat player
effect).
403. Id. at 240; Gorman, supra note 367, at 656.
404. Alleyne, supra note 178; Gorman, supra note 367, at 656.
405. In 1995, representatives of the American Bar Association, the American
Arbitration Association, the American Civil Liberties Union, the National Employment
Lawyers Association, and other groups agreed on a Due Process Protocol for Mediation
and Arbitration of Statutory Disputes arising out of the Employment Relationship, 9A
Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) No. 142, at 534:401 (May 9, 1995) [hereinafter Due Process
Protocol]. See Arnold M. Zack, The Evolution of the Protocol, 6 WORLD ARB. &
MEDIATION REP. 217,217-18 (1995) (recounting the history of the Protocol's adoption).
406. The U.S. Departments of Commerce and Labor created a Commission on the
Future of Worker-Management Relations, commonly known as the Dunlop Commission,
in 1993. Among other recommendations, the Commission formulated a list of "quality
standards" to govern the arbitration of statutory employment disputes. COMM. ON THE
FUTURE OF WORKER-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS, U.S. DEP'TS OF COMMERCE &
LABOR, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 30-33 (1994) [hereinafter DUNLOP
REPORT], available at http://www.dol.gov/dol/%5Fsec/publiclmedia/reports/dunlop/
dunlop.htm; see also Samuel Estreicher, The Dunlop Report and the Future of Labor Law
Reform, 12 LAB. LAW. 117, 129-30 (1996) (summarizing the Dunlop Report's "quality
standards" for employment arbitration).
407. See, e.g., Estreicher, Predispute Agreements, supra note 4, at 1349-50 (listing
procedural guidelines partially based on the Dunlop Report); Martin H. Malin, Arbitrating
Statutory Employment Claims in the Aftermath of Gilmer, 40 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 77, 95-99
(1996) (discussing the necessary features of an arbitration system that could be both just
and self-regulating).
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arbitration of employment disputes, and something of a consensus has
emerged.0 8 Under the terms of this (sometimes vague) consensus, a
procedurally adequate arbitration procedure must include the
following eight provisions: (1) a neutral arbitrator with knowledge of
the relevant law,4°9  (2) "[a]dequate but limited" discovery
provisions,410 (3) provisions for sharing the cost of arbitration so that
all employees can afford access to the arbitral forum,41' (4) an
employee right to be represented by counsel,412 (5) authority for the
arbitrator to award the full range of remedies authorized by the
relevant employment discrimination statute(s), 413 (6) a requirement
that the arbitrator issue a written decision explaining the reasons
behind his award,414 (7) an unlimited right of employees to file
charges with the EEOC and other appropriate agencies,415 and (8) a
reasonable location for the arbitration.4 6
408. See St. Antoine, supra note 385, at 6.
409. DUNLOP REPORT, supra note 406, at 31. In order to facilitate selection of a
neutral arbitrator, the Due Process Protocol imposes a duty on arbitrators to disclose
potential conflicts of interests and recommends that all parties to the arbitration be given
access to references from the arbitrator's last six cases. Due Process Protocol, supra note
405, at 402-03.
410. Due Process Protocol, supra note 405, at 402. Accord DUNLOP REPORT, supra
note 406, at 31 (calling for "a fair and simple method by which the employee can secure
the necessary information to present his or her claim"). The vagueness of these discovery
standards would of course lead to difficulties in application. Permitting the same level of
discovery the parties would enjoy in federal court would threaten to undermine the cost
advantages of arbitration, see id, but severe restrictions on the scope of discovery would
unfairly disadvantage plaintiffs. See Bales, supra note 242, at 755-56.
411. DUNLOP REPORT, supra note 406, at 31-32; Due Process Protocol, supra note 405,
at 404. While both the Dunlop Report and the Due Process Protocol call for fee sharing
between employer and employee, some circuit courts of appeals have held that the
employer should bear the full cost of compensating the arbitrator. Cole v. Burns Int'l Sec.
Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1483-85 (D.C. Cir. 1977) ("[lIt would undermine Congress's intent
to prevent employees who are seeking to vindicate statutory rights from gaining access to
a judicial forum and then require them to pay for the services of an arbitrator when they
would never be required to pay for a judge in court."); see also Shankle v. B-G Maint.
Mgmt. of Colo., Inc., 163 F.3d 1230, 1233 (10th Cir. 1999) (holding that mandatory
arbitration agreement requiring employees to pay part of the arbitrator's fees was
unenforceable); Paladino v. Avnet Computer Techs., Inc., 134 F.3d 1054, 1062 (11th Cir.
1998) (stating that agreement shifting part of the arbitration fees to employee was
unenforceable because it conflicted with the public policies that support Title VII).
412. DUNLOP REPORT, supra note 406, at 31; Due Process Protocol, supra note 405, at
402.
413. DUNLOP REPORT, supra note 406, at 31-32; Due Process Protocol, supra note 405,
at 403.
414. DUNLOP REPORT, supra note 406, at 31-32; see also Due Process Protocol, supra
note 405, at 404 (recommending that arbitrators write opinions summarizing the issues in
the dispute and their resolution).
415. Estreicher, Predispute Agreements, supra note 4, at 1349.
416. Id.
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These guidelines represent the conventional (and largely
consensual) wisdom on arbitral due process, but whether they go far
enough to insure arbitral neutrality is ultimately an empirical
question. So far, there has been no social scientific research to
indicate whether observance of the suggested due process norms
eliminates the repeat player effect.417 For now, the guidelines at least
provide a useful starting point for judicial scrutiny of arbitration
agreements.4 18 Courts should use them to develop specific due
process standards419 for the arbitration of statutory employment
discrimination claims, and should enforce those standards by refusing
to compel arbitration when the standards are not met.420
CONCLUSION
As Brown and Waffle House vividly illustrate, federal courts
currently treat agreements to arbitrate statutory discrimination claims
very differently depending on whether the employees who sign those
agreements are unionized or not. While the disparity in treatment
between unionized and nonunionized employees can be explained by
417. Bingham, supra note 21, at 244 (noting that extant research on the repeat player
effect in employment arbitration does not reflect the possible influence of the Due Process
Protocol). Bingham calls for further research to study the effects of arbitrator compliance
with due process norms on the outcomes of arbitration proceedings. Id If such research
tended to show that compliance with due process norms does not reduce the repeat player
effect, that result would provide a strong reason for Congress to take corrective action.
418. See Washington, supra note 292, at 880 (suggesting that courts use guidelines like
the Due Process Protocol as a foundation for meaningful procedural scrutiny of the
fairness of the arbitral process).
Some authorities have suggested that more searching judicial review is also
essential to ensuring that arbitration proceedings do not compromise substantive rights.
See, e.g., Cole v. Burns Int'l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1487 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (stating that
arbitration would compromise substantive rights unless judicial review under the
"manifest disregard of the law" standard is "sufficiently rigorous to ensure that arbitrators
have properly interpreted and applied statutory law"); DUNLOP REPORT, supra note 406,
at 31-32 (recommending "sufficient judicial review to ensure that the result is consistent
with the governing laws"); Malin, supra note 407, at 104-05 (arguing that the policies
behind federal employment discrimination statutes require that an arbitrator's
interpretations of law be subject to de novo judicial review); Washington, supra note 292,
at 883 (arguing that judges should overturn arbitration awards if they are "clearly
erroneous" or "clearly repugnant" to the statute's purposes). Discussion of the proper
standard of judicial review for arbitration proceedings involving statutory discrimination
claims is beyond the scope of this Note.
419. Washington emphasizes that due process standards governing arbitration must be
clear enough to "provide notice and guidance to arbitrators, employers, and employees."
Washington, supra note 292, at 882.
420. The opinion in Cole well illustrates the sort of judicial scrutiny that would help to
protect the statutory rights of employees. See Cole, 105 F.3d at 1479-88.
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and is consistent with the Supreme Court's evolving arbitration
jurisprudence, it cannot be justified. Current judicial practice may
adequately protect those employees who have effectively organized
to protect their interests, but leaves nonunionized employees
dangerously exposed to employer abuses of the sort chronicled in
Waffle House. Courts should move to rectify this situation by
extending Wright's "clear and unmistakable" standard to individual
employment contracts. They should also adopt and enforce due
process standards governing the arbitration of statutory employment
discrimination claims. These steps are necessary to offer
nonunionized employees a greater measure of protection against the
possibility that the loss of a public forum will carry with it the loss of
substantive rights.
JOHN E. TAYLOR
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